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fact of human impact on the environment (as humans have always had an 
impact insofar as we have been "embedded in biological systems"), but 
rather the unprecedented scale and pace of human impact.3 
Questions of justice now unfurl on spatial and temporal scales at once 
global and microscopic, immediate and spanning through the ages. Legal 
and political concepts of causation and responsibility are complicated and 
reconfigured by our growing awareness of the intergenerational 
consequences of contemporary choices. In this context, the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable 
Development ("Standing Committee") recently recommended that the 
Government of Canada create "an advocate for Canada's future 
generations."' The Standing Committee's report expressly cites growing 
transnational and international attention to the demands of 
"intergenerational equity''. noting that various jurisdictions have 
experimented with institutional committees or advocates for future 
generations.5 The challenges to such projects are daunting. How can we 
know our obligations to future persons who do not yet exist, or may not 
even come into being?6 
!bid at 100. 
House of Conunons, Standing Conunittee on Environment and Sustainable 
Development, Fedeml Sustainabili~y for Future Generations - A Report Following an 
Assessmmt of th1! Federal Sustainab/1! Development Act (June 2016) at 22, online: 
< ourcommons.ca> I Standing Committee, Fedn-al Sustainability]. 
!bid at 23-24. For an overview of international and domestic legal commitments and 
institutions for future generations, see lnte1generational Solidarity and the J.Veeds of' 
Future Genemtions, UNGA OR, 68th Sess, Annex, Agenda item 19, UN Doc A/68/150 
(2013) ax paras 32-48, online: <https://sustainabledevdopment.un.org/ concenc/ 
documents/ 2006futurc.pdf> [United Nations]. 
Note in particular the Standing Committee's observation that "future generations have 
no voice in today's decision making that will ulrimarcly affect their interests": Standing 
Conunirree, frderal Sustainability. supra note 4 at 22. 'l 'his concern that the interests of 
voiceless future persons pose a challenge ford emocratic governance is a common theme 
in intergenerational justice literature-much of v;rhich focuses on creating institutions 
that might serve a representative function respecting future generations. For overviews 
of proposed institutional responses, see Michael Kates, "Justice, Democracy, and Future 
Generations" (2015) 18:5 Crit Rev Inr'l Soc & Pol Phil 508; Philippe Van l'arijs, "The 
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Edith Brown Weiss's foundational articulation of "intergenerational 
equity" urges us to imagine char "each generation receives a natural and 
cultural legacy in trust from previous generations and holds it in trust for 
future generations."7 The concept, drawing on legal trusteeship, conjures a 
series of distinct and identifiable "generations", linked to each other through 
a chain of discrete transactions.s This analytic move-treating generations 
as monoliths with separate, identifiable, and competing interests-is a 
remarkable feature of the exploding body ofliterature on "intergenerational 
justice" and "intergenerational equity."~ Intergenerational justice, on chis 
account, is concerned with a "fundamentally different" problem from 
intra-generational justice, which concerns disparities of circumstances, 
resources, or interests within a given generation. These disparities have been 
a central focus of the environmental justice movement, but have been given 
Disenfranchisement of rhe Elderly, and Other Arremprs to Secure Inrergencrarional 
Tustice" (1998) 27:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 292; Dennis F Thompson, 
"Democracy in Time: Popular Sovereignty and' kmporal Representation" ( 200 S) 12: 2 
Consrellarions 245. 
Edith Brown \~'eiss, ln .F.tirness to Future Genemtions: lnternation..d Law, Common 
Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equi~y (New York: 'lbnsnational Publishers, 1989) 
at 2 [Brown \Vciss, In Fairness J. 
In fact, Brown Weiss explicitly references legal-doctrinal articularions of common law 
and civillaw trust doctrine in ha analysis. See ibid at 2, n 3; Edith Brown Weiss, "The 
Planetary 'frust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity" (1984) 11:4 Ecology 
LQ49S. 
The terms "intergenerational justice" and "intergenerational equity" appear to be used 
interchangeably in much of the literature. But see United Nations, supra note 5 
(proposing that intergenerational justice is a broader concept in that it includes not only 
distribution over time, but also "procedural, restorative, and retributive dimensions" at 
para 10). \\le have preferred to use rhe term "inrergenerarional justice" in describing our 
own project, because we think that it is more evocative of the "social justice" and 
"environmental justice" traditions that inform our analysis-and because it avoids the 
implication thar generations arc uni rs rhar may he subjecrs of"equity". Because we seek 
to problematize the treatment of"generations" as the relevant unit of analysis, it might 
be even more precise to use a term like "intertemporal justice" (or even "intertemporal 
rclarions'; to avoid rhc individualistic tenor of "jusrice" in some srrands of liberal 
legalism), but we have instead elected "intergenerational justice" so as to keep this work 
more directly in conversation witl1 the existing scholarship in this field. 
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little if any attention by many scholars working under the banner of 
intergenerational equity.I'' 
In order to conceive of intergenerational justice, conventional 
constructions (which we will refer to as "the orthodox approach") resort to 
rough averages across time, glossing over the vast disparities in how the 
resources of the "trust" are distributed amongst the so-called "beneficiaries". 
In order to operationalize the concept, then, one must create an 
aggregate measure of well-being rather than "analyse the various 
circumstances and living conditions of individuals at a given point in 
time."11 The United Nations' influential Bnmddand Report of 1987, 
following Brown Weiss, adopted a formulation of "sustainable 
development" that similarly flattens the vast social differences between 
people inhabiting any given moment, calling for "development which meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs."" Critics remark that this approach 
"reflects a concern with equity mainly in the inter-generational sense .... 
[with J only a faint suggestion in the definition of concern for distributive 




This split parallels the division Harris observes between discourses of"social justice" and 
"sustainability": Harris, supm note l at 104-05. See also Andrew Dobson's related 
observation of a disconnect between discoursesof"justice" and "sustainability": Andrew 
Dobson, "Introduction" in Andrew Dobson, ed, Fairness and Futurity: Essays rm 
Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
Toerg Chet Tremmel, "Introduction" in Joerg Chet Tremmel, ed, Handbook of 
lntergenerationaljustice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006) 1 at 5. 
Report rf the TVf1rld Commission rm Environment & D evelopment: Ou r Common Future, 
UNWCEDOR, UN Doc A/42/427 (1987) at para 27. 
M ichael McCluskey, "Emperor Has No Cloches: The Conundrum of Sustainable 
Development" (1999) 9:2 Duke Envrl L & l'ol'y F 153 at 154. Sumudu Ataparru 
observes that, not coincidentally, "[a]lthough it is not possible to generalize, Northern 
countries tend to emphasize intergenerational equity, while Southern states tend to 
emphasize intragenerational equity": Sumudu Araparru, "The Significance of 
International Environmental Law Principles in Reinforcing or Dismantlingthe North-
Sourh Divide" in Shawkar Alam er al, eds, International Environmnmil Law and the 
Global South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 74 at 91-92. 
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In other words, the problems of "intra-generational justice" are cast on 
the orthodox account as separable and separate from justice of the 
"intergenerational" variety. It is this dichotomous treatment of intra- and 
intergenerational justice that we wish to challenge, using the context of 
"everyday toxics" as our central case study. We argue that this tendency in 
the orthodox intergenerational justice literature to define the "interests" ofa 
given generation as an aggregate of all individual interests, is both 
misleading as description and perilous as prescription. It glosses over the 
significant disparities within generations, and thus cannot provide the 
analytical tools to think about how those disparities persist and transform 
over time. The conventional, dualist theory of intergenerational equity 
referenced above has generally been developed in the contexts of climate 
change and natural resource depletion. Given the reality that particular 
individuals and communities will have diHerent abilities to insulate 
themselves from the effects of climate change and resource scarcity, there is 
reason to doubt this approach even in the contexts where it was first 
advanced. 14 But in the context of everyday toxics, the social dimensions of 
potential intergenerational harms are especially stark. 
This article will illustrate the interconnections between-in fact the 
inseparability of-intra- and intergenerational justice, focusing on two 
categories of"everyday toxics". Exposure to everyday toxics occurs routinely 
to everyone living in the industrialized Global North as they move d1rough 
their days coming into repeated contact with endocrine-disrupting 
chemicals and other toxics present in ambient air and drinking water, and 
"built-in" to their home, work and school environments.15 The two 
categories of everyday toxics that we employ in this paper are Brominated 
Flame Retardants (BFRs) and phthalates. Exposures to BFRs and 
phthalates present initial adverse health risks to those exposed, and they 
li 
l S 
See Anna Grear, "Towards New Legal Futures? In Search of Renewing Foundations" in 
Anna Grear & Evadnc Gram, eds, Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age of 
Environmental Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) 283 at 286. 
Endocrine Disruptors Action Group, Toxic ~y Dt!sign: liliminating HarmfUl flame 
Rettirdant Chemical< From Our Bodies, Homes, & Communities (2016), onlinc: 
< rndocrinedisruptorsaction.org>. 
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may also have consequences for the generations that flow from those 
initially exposed. These consequences cannot be adequately understood or 
addressed without attention to the matrix of social, ecological, and material 
forces that bring these chemicals into economies, communities, homes, and 
bodies; that shape the lives of those experiencing their possible effects; and 
that build the pathways through which those effects traverse generations. 
In light of these interlocking social, ecological, and material realities of 
exposure and effects, we advance an alternative theoretical approach 
drawing on relational theory, a body of scholarship that has long advocated 
contextual analysis, focus on the embodied diversity of individual persons, 
and appreciation for the centrality of social relationships in defining justice 
problems and crafting responses. The literature on relational theory to 
date has not engaged directly with questions of intergenerationaljustice-
questions which are at the center of our consideration of everyday toxics, 
given the long time-horizons of their possible effects.16 As noted above, the 
orthodox account of intergenerational justice often lacks a sophisticated 
account of social relationships. Our aim in chis paper is to bridge the gap 
between these approaches by exploring what a relational acwunt of 
intergenerational justice rn ight entail. 
Part II of this paper elaborates our core case study: everyday exposure to 
endocrine-disrupting (or hormone-disrupting) chemicals, particularly 
BF Rs and phthalates. We explain our choice to focus on this particular issue 
with reference to several contextual factors that make BFR and phthalate 
exposure a particularly salient context for working through a more 
relational account of intergenerational justice, namely: ( 1) the ubiquity of 
these chemicals, and the enduring political economic context 
undergirding their pervasiveness, (2) the nature and uncertainty of 
potential harms, and (3) the social determinants of exposure levels and 
possible adverse health consequences. 
Part III describes the orthodox account of intergenerational justice, and 
its critics, emphasizing this account's problematic tendency to elide 
significant social contexts through recourse to generational aggregates. Part 
IV introduces our proposed alternative: a relational approach to 
ll> See Part IV, bdow. 
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intergenerational justice. This part begins by setting out the basic contours 
of relational theory, a body of scholarship that has long emphasized 
attention to context and relationship, and setting out the challenges and 
opportunities that long time horizons pose for relational theory. The 
balance of the paper explores two dimensions of "uncertainty" about the 
future which demand further exploration in order to flesh out a relational 
account of intergenerational justice: the uncertainty that derives from the 
fact that the forces of toxic materiality resist prediction and control (Part 
IV.A), and the indeterminacy that derives from a context where the relevant 
constituencies do not yet exist-focusing in particular on critical 
perspectives on futurity and embodied difference (IV.B ). These 
explorations will draw on interdisciplinary scholarly traditions-material 
feminism and critical disability studies respectively-that have developed 
largely outside oflegal scholarship. 
More specifically, Part IV.A will build on existing relational criticisms of 
the privilegingof"control" in liberal accounts ofhuman autonomy, and will 
confront the challenge of how political communities might craft stances 
towards present and future justice problems which embrace uncertainty 
while resisting defeatism. This part will rely on scholarship within a 
material feminist mode to illuminate the extent to which our desires to 
predict and "control" our futures may be troubled by the activities of 
chemicals and other materials whose movements might be understood 
as "agentic". 
Part IV.B will ask how the relational imperative to solicit diverse 
perspectives might operate in an intergenerational context where some 
relevant constituencies do not yet exist, and cannot therefore be directly 
consulred in contemporary legal and political processes. This section will 
resist the tendency in the orthodox intergenerational justice literature to 
resort to "objective" accounts ofhuman interest, and will argue instead that 
a relational approach to intergenerational justice requires attention to 
diverse perspectives on futurity. To this end, this section will elaborate on 
one crucial discourse that is omitted from the orthodox account of 
intergenerational justice, and from many public conversations about 
everyday toxics, namely critical disability studies. In particular, this 
exploration will demonstrate the need for caution in defining "harm" in 
ways that are both responsive to the potentially urgent consequences of 
 8 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL 51:1 
toxic exposures, and respectful of the diverse bodies that populate our 
contemporary and future worlds. 
Part V concludes with a synthesis of the ways in which these analyses 
might contribute to an ecologically- and materially-immersed relational 
account of intergenerational justice. Here, the orthodox framing of a series 
of discrete, monolithic "generations" with distinct and competing interests 
is replaced by an account of embodied subjects who are constituced by 
interwoven threads of personal, institutional, material, and ecological 
relationships-each of which connect persons and responsibilities over 
time. While the focus of this article is on the need to reorient the 
theoretical foundations of intergenerational justice, some reflections are 
offered in conclusion on the more concrete implications of our proposed 
approach for efforts to craft laws and institutions that may better account 
for the diverse interests of future persons. 
II. EVERYDAY TOXICS IN CONTEXT 
Lead poisoning from tap water in Flint, Michigan presents a recent, 
unusually public example of the uneven effects of everyday toxics in North 
America. 17 A growing body of scientific research on everyday toxic exposure 
has led to a shift in "concern about environmental pollution from outdoors 
to indoors ... , and from rivers to veins."1' Unlike lead, around which there 
17 
I~ 
See "That Flinty Taste: How Michigan State Government Endangered the People of 
Flinr" The Emnomist (23 January 2016), online: <\V\V\v.economist.com>. The horror in 
Flinr demonstrates vividly the way rhar today's toxic exposures (in this case lead, which 
harms the brains of growing children) are layered onto existingdisadvamage (the racism 
that poor, Black childrrn in Hint already face), and constitute our fotures (as those 
exposed children grow in to adults with high health burdens ,rnd lower earnings. further 
fuelling racist attitudes that diminish them and their own future children's worth). See 
also Laura Pulido, "Hint, Environmental Racism, and Racial Capitalism" (2016) 27:3 
Capitalism Namre Socialism 1 (arguing rhat Flint's poisoning is a powerful example of 
environmental racism and racial capitalism). 
RG Altman er al, "Pollution Comes Home and Gets Personal: \'{romcn's Experience of 
Household Chemical Exposure" (2008) 49:4 J Health & Soc Behav 417 at 418, citing 
Douglas Fischer, "Stare to Trace Toxins from Streams to Veins", The 011kland Tribune 
(29 September 2006). See also Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk.? Making Deci.iions in a Toxic 
Environment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); 1'1ichdle Murphy, Sick 
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phthalates are used as plasticizers in polyvinyl chloride (PVC), which is in 
turn used in building materials, plumbing, floors, wall coverings, and food 
processing equipment.22 Phthalate esters are used as solvents and plasticizers 
in lacquers, varnishes, nail polish, hairspray, perfumes, lotions, cosmetics, 
pharmaceutical capsules, medical devices (including intravenous tubing, 
blood nutrient bags, and tubing used in neonatal intensive care nurseries), 
and children's toys and bath books.23 These common chemicals have been 
detected in household dust, food, drinking water, and human breast milk.' 1 
Studies of human exposure to phthalates have "established an accepted 
consistent presence of these chemicals in human systems,"'5 and the Center 
for Disease Control reports that nearly all Americans exhibit "measurable 
levels" of phthalates in their bodily tissues.U' 
Brominated Flame Retardants-BFRs-are similarlyubiquicous, used 
in mattresses, upholstered furniture, televisions, computers, cars, clothing, 
and children's toys.27 Like phthalates, BFRs are found in household dust,2" 
2 1 
25 
Sec Donatclla Caserra er al, "The Influence of Endocrine Disruptors in a Selected 
Population oflnferrile Women" (2013) 29: S Gynecological Endocrinology444 at 446; 
Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 307; Swan, supra note 21 ar 177. 
Sec Swan, supra note 21 at 178; Donarella Caserta er al, supra note 22 at 446. 
See Grady & Sarhyanarayana, supra note 21 ar 307, citing Ruthann A Rudel et al, 
"Phthalates, Alkylphenols, Pesticides, Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers, and Other 
Endocrine-disrupting Compounds in Indoor Air and Dust" (2003) 37:20 Envd Sci & 
Tech 4543 and Katharina M Main ct al. "Human Breast J\filk Contamination >vith 
Phthalates and Alterations of Endogenous Reproductive Hormones in Infants Three 
Monchs of Age" (2006) 114:2 Envd Healch Perspectives 270. 
Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 309, citing Michael H Hsieh et al, 
"Associations Among Hypospadias, Cryptorchidism, Anogenical Distance, and 
Endocrine Disruption" (2008) 9:2 Curr Urology H.137. 
Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 307, citing US, Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, Third National Report on Human Exposure to Environment1zl Chemic1zl> 
(Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health, Division of 
Laboratory Sciences, 200 5). 
Sec Alcursu er al, supra note 21 at 345; John D Meeker er al, "Polybrominarcd Di phenyl 
Ed1er (PBDE) Concentrations in House Dust are Related to Hormone Levels in Men" 
(2009) 407: 10 Sci Tora! Environment 3425; Chanley M Small ct al, "Reproductive 
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and are "increasingly present in che environment and humans."2v BFRs have 
been found in human blood, tissue, and breast milk, at particularly elevated 
levels in North America where the use and manufacture ofBFRs remain 
highest."1 Even in jurisdictions where the manufacture and use of specific 
BFRs has been phased-out or curbed (either voluntarily or under legal 
compulsion), human exposure continues due to the presence of those 
substances in older products, and due to the environmental persistence of 
these chemicals." 
The reasons for this pervasiveness are complex. Capitalist imperatives of 
growth and accumulation, and Global North consumerism are major 




Outcomes Among Women Exposed to a Brominated Flame Retardant in Utero" (2011) 
66:4Arch Env & Occup H 201at201; Young Ran Kim et al, "Health Consequrncesof 
Exposure to Brominated Flame Retardants: A Systematic Review" (2014) 106 
Chemosphere 1 at 2. 
See Meeker et al, supra note 27 at 3425, citingJoseph G Allen et al, "LinkingPBDEs in 
House Dust to Consumer Products Using X-ray Fluorescence'' (2008) 42: 11 Envtl Sci 
&Tech4222. 
Kim ct al, supm note 27 at 2. Sec also Mahiba Shoeib ct al, "Legacy and Current-Use 
Flame Retardants in House Dust from Vancouver, Canada" (2012) 169 Envtl 
Pollution 175. 
See lvfeeker et al, supra note 27 at 3425. See also Small et al, supra note 27 (noting 
widespread exposure at 201), citing Andreas Sjodin et al, "Serum Concentrations of 
Poly-brominated Di phenyl Ethers (PBDEs) and PolybrominatedBiphenyl (PBB) in the 
United States Population: 2003-2004" (2008) 42:4 Envtl Sci &Tech 1377 (and noting 
persistence in the envi ronment and organic tissue); Kathleen Kreiss, Caralee Roberts & 
Harold EB Humphrey, "Serial PBB Levels, PCB Levels, and Clinical Chemistries in 
J\fichigan's PBB Cohort" (1982) 37:3 Arch Envtl Health 141; and Jacob de Boer, Karin 
de Boer & Jan P Boon, "Polybrominated Biphenyls and Diphenyl Ethers" in Jaakko 
Paasivirta, cd, The H1wdbook of Environmental Chemistry: P1irt K· N ew Typ e.< of 
Per:•istent H.dogenated Compounds, vol 3 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2000) 61. 
Sec Meeker ct al, supm note 27 at 3425, citing US EPA, PolybmmirliitedDiphenylEthers 
(PBDEs) Project Plan (\X'.tshington, DC: United States Environmental l'rotection 
Agency Office of Pollution Prevention Toxics, 2006). See also Kim et al, supra note 27 
at 2. 
This has been recognized in the climate change context as well. Sec e.g. l' Newell & M 
Patterson, Climate Capitalism: Global H1m ning and the Transformation oftht Global 
12 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL 51:1 
cannot be readily duplicated by non-toxic substances.'1 Moreover, 
phthalates are made from the by-products of oil refining, and their 
manufacture is supported by "industrial ecologies" that encourage the 
repurposing of toxic waste.31 BF Rs rely on chemical inputs which are highly 
toxic, resulting in a small number of manufacturing sites concentrated in 
the United States and Israel. 15 The BFR industry has been active in 
promoting standards that eftectively require the use of these flame 
retardants in household products as a fire safety precaution, despite 
questions about the safety and effectiveness ofBFRs in real fires."' In both 
cases, powerful economic actors have carefully cultivated a regulatory 
environment in which uncertain, contested and incomplete scientific 
evidence about the health effects of everyday toxic exposures persists.'" 
33 
3) 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): M Koch, Capitalism and 
Climate Change: Theoretical Discussion, Historical Development and Policy Responses 
(Basingstoke: Palgravc i\facmillan, 2012). 
As an example, the addition of phthalatcs to PVC, such as for use in plumbing, renders 
plastic less brittle and thus more durable and versatile. According to the Lowell Center 
for Sustainable Production, PVC products contain up to 50% by weight of plasticizers, 
mosrly phthalatcs. \\Thilc there arc alternatives available, many of them arc also of 
unknown toxicity. See Lowell Center for Sustainable Production, Phthalates and Their 
A!tanativ1cs: He1ifth and Environmental Concerns (Lowell, MA: University of 
Massachusetts, 2011 ), o.nline: <susrainableproduccio.n.org>. 
See e.g. Hardin B Tibbs, "The Value Loop - A New Framework for Business Thinking" 
in Dora Marinova, David Annandale & John Phillimorc, eds, The Internation1if 
Handbook on Environmental Technology 1Wanagement (Northampton, ~\fA: Edward 
Elgar, 2006). 
Sec P Guerra ct al, "Introduction to Brominatcd Flame Retardants: Commercially 
Products, Applications, and Physicochernical Properties;' in E Eljarrat and D Barcelo, 
eds, Bmminated Flame Ret11rd1wts, Handbook of Environmental Chemistry, vol 16, 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2011) 1at6-7. 
Sec Endocrine Disruprors Action Group, supra note 15. 
See e.g. David Michaels, Doubt !( Their Product: How Industry'.( Assault on Science 
Thrtatens Your Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): r Pearce & S 'fombs, 
'"foxic Capitalism: Corporate Crime and the Chemical bidustry" in D Whyte, ed, 
Crimes ofthe Porverji;f: A Reader (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009) 93. 
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These dynamics are exacerbated by the endurance, in Canada and the 
United States, of a "permissive approach" to chemicals regulation in which 
the burden of proof falls on those trying to show that chemicals are 
harmful, and not on those who profit from their production and release.-'s 
Since the early 1990s, environmental advocates have made efforts to 
pressure state regulators to adopt a more precautionary approach. 19 But 
while the "precautionary principle" has been enshrined in policy statements 
and legislative preambles, the operation of the relevant regulatory 
frameworks are still largely permissive in practice.'0 In line with this 
approach, and driven by the prevailing tenets of neoliberalism, the reforms 
that have been introduced to manage the emerging risks from everyday 
toxics have favoured voluntary, information-based regulatory measures.ii 
There are thus relatively few legal restraints on the industrial and market 
processes driving the production of these chemicals, and their 
incorporation into consumer products. 12 In cases where particular 




See e.g. Lynda Collins & Heat her McLeod-Kilmurray, The Canadian LmvofToxir Torts 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 20 14); Dayna N adinc S corr, "Testing Toxiciry: l'rooLmd 
Precaution in Canada's Chemicals Management Plan" (2009) 18: l RE CIEL 59 [Scott, 
'"ksting 'foxicity"]; Adam DK Abdkop & John Graham, "Regulation of Chemical 
Risks: Lessons for Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act from Canada and the 
European Union" (2015) 32:1 Pace Envd L Rev 108. 
See e.g. Hugh Benevides & Theresa McClenaghan, Implementing Pretaution:AnNGO 
Re.1ponse to the Governmmt of Canada's Discussion Document ('foromo: Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, April 2002), online: <www.cda.ca/ sices/ cda.ca/ 
filcs/ uploads/419preeautionary.pdf>. Sec also the recent report of rhe Standing 
Committee: House of Commons, Standing Committee on Environment and 
Sustainable] )cvclo pm enc, Healthy Environment, Healthy Canadians, H ealthy Economy: 
Strengthening the Cm.idian Environmental Protertion Act, 1999 (June 2017), online: 
<http ://>vww.ourcommons.ca/ ])ocumcntVicwcr I en/ 42-1 / ENVI/ rcporr-8 >. 
Scott, "Testing Toxicity': supr.-t note 38. 
D ayna Nadine Scott, "Thinking about Thresholds, Literal and Figurative" in Dayna 
Nadine Scott, cd, Our Chemical Selves: Gender, Ti1xics, and Environmental H ealth 
(Vancouver: UBC l'rcss, 2015). 
Sec e.g. Phthalates Regul11tions, SOR/ 2010-298, and Children's Sleepwear 
Regulations, SOR/2011 -15 (for examples of existing regulations in Canada). 
 14 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL 51:1 
chemicals with similar properties which have not yet been subject to 
scientific scrutiny or advocacy and attention!' This problem of" regrettable 
substitution" has given rise to the critique that the health and 
environmental agencies charged with ensuring chemical safety have been 
drawn into a costly game of regulatory "whack-a-mole".44 
B. DISPARATE IJ\fl'ACT 
As pervasive as BFR and phthalate exposure may be, it is not evenly 
distributed. In fact, researchers have begun to chart familiar patterns of 
human exposure across demographic groups.4' Their findings suggest that, 
whatever the precise effects of BFR and phthalate exposure prove to be, 
they will likely be felt unevenly across diverse social constituencies. This 
research has shown, for example, that workers in certain manufacturing 
industries exhibit higher phthalate levels and that e-waste recycling workers 
have higher BFR levels due to occupational exposure.'" Certain racialized 
groups,47 and those with lower levels of income and education," have also 
4."\ 
4 ) 
See e.g. Gregory DL Morris, "Phchalates Ban in 'loys Spurs Alcernacives" (2009) 171:5 
Chemical \'('eek 25; Arlene Blum, "Tackling Toxics" (2016) 351:6278 Science 1117 . 
\~'idespread animal testing is permitted and encouraged at every stage of this process, 
wich no legal onus on any parry to escablish thac che chemicals at issue will be put to 
socially useful or necessary applications. See e.g. Lesli Bisgould, Animal> and the Law 
(' foromo: Irwin Law, 2011) ac 201-23 3. C/Mimi Brody, "Animal Research: A Call for 
Legislative Reform Requiring Echical Meric Review" ( 1989) 13:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 423. 
See Blum, supra note 43 (describing the "regrettable substitmion of a harmfol chemical 
with a less-studied cousin" as being"like 'a game of whack-a-mole: according to Donald 
Kennedy (former editor-in-chief of Science and former commissioner of the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration)" at 1117). 
Sec Swan, supra note 21 at 178. 
See Cynthia J Hines et al, "Estimated Daily Intake of Phthalates in Occupationally 
Exposed Groups" (2011) 21:2] Expo Eci Env Epid 133; Nguyen Minh 'foe et al, 
"Accumulation of l'olychlorinarcd Biphcnyls and Brominatcd Flame Retardants in 
Breast ~.\filk from W1omen Living in Vietnamese E-waste Recycling Sites" (2010) 408:9 
Sci 'focal Environ 2155. 
See Roni W Kobmsly et al, "Socioeconomic Factors and Phthalate ;\fetabolite 
Concentrations among Uniced Scates Women of Reproduccive Age" (2012) 11 S Envtl 
Res 11; Heather M Stapleton ct al, "Scrum l'BDEs in a North Carolina Toddler 
2018 INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 15 
been found to exhibit particularly high levels of exposure to certain 
phchalates. Exposure to some BF Rs has similarly been found to be highest 
in low-income communities of colour.49 Although BFR and phthalate 
exposure occurs in the home, school, and workplace, these demographic 
exposure patterns reverberate with the longstanding environmental justice 
problem that marginalized communities are also disproportionately 
exposed to ambient environmental pollution, notably poor air quality. \() 
Research on BFR and phthalate exposure demographics remains in its 
preliminary stages, and the explanatory variables that might account for 
differential exposure are not well understood. Researchers have 
hypothesized that culturally and economically influenced factors such as 
diet, housing stock, furniture quality, and use of personal care products may 
Cohort: Associations with Handwipcs, House Dust, and Socioeconomic Variables" 
(2012) 120 Envd Health Perspectives 1049; cf' Huguem 'forgeon O 'Brien et al, 
"Exposure to 'foxic Metals and Persistent Organic Pollutams in Inuit Children 
Attending Childcare Centers in Nunavik, Canada" ( 2012) 46: 8 Envtl Sci & Tech 4614. 
See Kobrolsy et al, supra note 47; Jung-Wan Koo et al, "The Association Between 
Biomarker-based Exposure Estimates for Phthalates and Demographic Factors in a 
Human Reference Population" (2002) 110:4 Envtl Health Perspectives 405. 
See Zota et al, "PHDEs", supra note 21; Stapleton et al, supra note 47; Gary 
Adamkiewicz et al, "Moving Environmental Justice Indoors: Understanding Structural 
Influences on Residential Exposure Patterns in Low-Income Conununities" (2011) 
101 :Sl AmJ Pub Health 5238 at S241; Ami R Zora er al, "Elevated House Dust and 
Serum Concentrations of PBDEs in California: Unintended Consequences of 
Furniture Flammability Standards?" ( 200 8) 42: 21 Envrl Sci & Tech 8158; Melissa Rose 
et al, "PBDEs in 2-5 Year-old Children from California and Associations with Diet and 
Indoor Environment" (2010) 44:7 Envd Sci & 'lC:ch 2648; Gayle C Windham et al, 
"Body Burdens of Brominated Flame Retardanrs and Other Persistent Organo-
H alogenated Compounds and their Descriptors in US Girls" (2010) 110:3 Envtl 
Research 251. Conversely, exposure to some HF Rs is higher among groups of higher 
socio-economic status. See Stapleton et al, supra note 47. 
See e.g. Dayna Nadine Scott, "Situating Sarnia: 'Unimagined Communities' in d1e New 
National Energy Debate" (2013) 25 J Envtl L & Prac 81; Zora et al, "PBDEs", supra 
note 21; Rob Nixon, SioUJ Violence and the Environmentalism ofthe Poor (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011);11ichad Buzzelli, EnviromnentalJustite in Canada: it 
lvfatters T1/here Yrm Live (Canadian Policy Research Ncrnmrk, 2008), onlinc: 
<rcrpp.ca/documents/ 50875 _EN .pdf>. 
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be significant. 51 Many researchers working in this field have further 
suggested that, in order to fully understand the impact of these differential 
exposure levels on marginalized populations, it will be necessary to study 
the ways that phthalate and BFRexposure interacts with a number of social 
variables, including nutrition, time spent indoors, and stress levels 
associated with poverty or housing insecurity.52 Moreover, public health 
responses have often encouraged individuals and families to insulate 
themselves from BFR and phd1alate exposure through purchasing decisions 
(i.e., "precautionary consumption") and household maintenance-
directions which present special obstacles for those without adequate 
economic resources and which have been shown to place disproportionate 
burdens on women in particular.'' While the precise consequences of 
exposure remain uncertain (as will be discussed in the following 
subsection), the social dimensions of BFR and phthalate exposure suggest 
that any resulting effects are likely to compound existing social and 
economic cleavages. 
C. UNCERTAIN EHEC'l'S 
Both BFRs and pluhalates have come under scrutiny in recent years, as 
scientific research has begun co illuminate possible health consequences 
associated with these chemicals. In adults, exposure to phthalates has been 
linked to infertility and to effects on the liver and kidneys, including 
increased risk ofliver cancer.51 Studies show that men in particular may be 
vulnerable to decreased respiratory function, obesity, insulin resistance, and 
52 
53 
Kobrolsy et al, supra note 47 at 12; Zota et al, «PBDEs", supm note 21; Adamkiewic et 
al, supra note 49 at S241. 
Zota et al, "PBDEs''. supra note 21 at 5692; Rachel Morello-Frosch et al, 
"Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Inequalities in Environmental Health: 
Implications for Policy" (2011) 30:5 H Aff879. 
Sec Dayna Nadine Scott, Jennie Haw & Robyn Lee, '"W~rnnabc Toxic Free?' From 
Precautionary Consumption to Corporeal Citizenship" (2017) 26:2 Envtl Pol 322. 
Swan, supra note 21 at 177; Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 309 (citing 
Giovanna Ti·anfo et al, "Urinary Phthalate Monoesters Concentration in Couples with 
Infertility Problems" (2012) 213:1 'fox Lett 15). 
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effects on the thyroid, due to phthalate exposure.15 In women, one recent 
study has associated the presence of phthalate metabolites in women's urine 
with low bone density and heightened incidence of osteoporosis.SC' 
Childhood exposure to various phthalates in household dust has been 
linked to asthma, wheezing, rhinitis and eczema.'7 BFRs may also have 
co nse q uen ces for those exposed-i nduding altered ho rm one levels, 18 earlier 
onset of puberty for girls,59 and other effects on endocrine system 
functioning.6° One recent meta-study ofBFR research concluded that there 
is a "possible relationship between BFR exposure and serious health 
consequences, namely cancer, such as digestive system cancers and 
lymphoma, reproductive health effects, alteration in thyroid function, 
neurobehavioral and developmental outcomes in children, and diabetes.''61 
The effects ofBFR and phthalate exposure, moreover, may reach across 
generationallines. There is increasing scientific support for the theory that 
children, even grandchildren, of those exposed to BF Rs and phthalates may 
incur health consequences. In part, this concern arises from studies on the 
effects of in utero and early childhood exposure. In utero exposure to 
phthalates, for example, has been associated with decreased testosterone 
production during the sex differentiation phase of fetal development, 
resulting in morphological differences in male genitalia, some of which may 
51 Swan, supm note 21 at 182-83. 
56 Kyoung-bok Min & Jin-young Min, "Urinary Phthalate Metabolites and the Risk of 
Low Hone Mineral Density and Osteoporosis in Older \\!omen" (2014) 99: 10 J Clin 
Endocr ~Ietab El997. 
57 Swan, supm note 21 at 182. 
58 :Meeker er al, supm note 27 at 3428. 
59 Small et al, supra note 27 at 205 (citing Heidi Michels Blanck et al, "Age at Menarche 
and Tanner Stage in Girls Exposed in Utero and Postnatally to Polybrominated 
Bi phenyl" (2000) 11 :6 Epidemiology 641 ). 
60 Meeker et al, supra noce 27 at 3426. 
61 Kirn et al, .iupra note 27 at 17. 
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affect reproductive health later in life. 62 Similarly, elevated BFR levels in 
women have been associated with physical consequences for their male 
babies, including lower testosterone levels and testicle size/'3 as well as lower 
sperm production throughout adult life.61 Females exposed to BF Rs in utero 
and through their mothers' breast milk have been found to be more likely to 
experience spontaneous abortions as adults.65 While the "exact mechanism" 
remains to be explained, scientists hypothesize that in utero exposure to 
certain BFRs may affect the development of the female reproductive 
system, including the fetal development of the primordial follicles which 
supply eggs throughout a woman's life."'" Temporally and generationally 
speaking, the effects of BFR and phthalate exposure may be far-reaching, as 
health effects may continue to present multiple generations after exposure.67 
Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 308-09 (noting, in particular, evidence 
that phthalatc exposure has been linked to reduced anogcnital distance); Swan, supra 
note 21. 
"' J\fcekcr er al, supra note 27 at 3428 ( citingMcijcr er al, "Influence ofl'rcnatal Exposure 
to Selected Organohalogcns on Infant Sexual and Neurological D evelopment" (2008) 
70:658 Organohalogen Compounds J 61 ). 
(-}4 Meeker et al, supra note 27 at 3428 (citing animal studies). 
Small ct al, supra note 27 . 
(>(; ibid. 
"
7 J\fatthew D Anway er al, "Epigenetic Transgcncrarional Actions of Endocrine 
Disruptors and ~fale Fertility'' (2005) 308:5727 Science 1466; Jocelyn Kaiser, 
"Endocrine Disrupters 'lhgger fertility Problems in Multiple Generations" (2005) 
308: 5727 Science 1391 at 1391; Sarah C Marrcinson er al, "Multi-generational Effects 
of Polybrominated Diphenylethers Exposure: Embryonic Exposure of Male American 
Kestrels (hlco sparverius) to DE-71 Alters Reproductive Success and Behaviors" (2010) 
29: 8 Envrl Toxicology & Chemistry 1740; Kim J Fernie ct al, "Changes in Reproductive 
Courtship Behaviors of Adult American Kestrels (Falco sparverius) Exposed to 
Environmentally Relevant Levels of the Polybrominated Diphrnyl Ether Mixture, 
DE-71" (2008) 102:1 Toxicological Sci 171; Kim J Fernie er al, "Environmentally 
Relevant Concentrations of DE-71 and HBCD Alter Eggshell Thickness and 
Reproductive Success of American Kestrels" (2009) 43:6 Envd Sci & 'frch 2124; 
Timothy J Doyle ct al, "Transgcncrarional Effccrs ofDi-(2-erhylhcxyl ) Phrhalarc on 
Testicular Germ Cell Associations and Spermatogonial Stem Cells in Mice" (2013) 88:5 
Biol Reprod 112 at 10. 
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The emerging research on "epigenetics" sheds further light on the 
intergenerational nature of possible exposure effects. Epigenetics describes a 
process by which bodies are able to "detect their environment and tag 
the DNA in ways that can be understood by the cells of subsequent 
offapring . . . [thus] allow[ ing] cells to adapt very rapidly to their 
environment and [to] pass that adaptation on to future generations."6~ 
Research into a number of chemicals including endocrine-disruptors like 
BFRs and phthalates is showing possible epigenetic-and elms 
intergenerational-effects related to various chronic conditions and 
illnesses such as cancer, diabetes and obesity, infertility, respiratory diseases, 
as well as allergies and neurodegenerative disorders such as Parkinson's and 
Alzheimer's disease.69 
Epigenetics research has emerged over the past 15 years to show how, 
through various biochemical processes, genes become "switched on and off" 
in response to changes in their environment. As an example, what scientists 
learned from studying the health later in life of children whose mothers 
experienced a famine while they were in utero, is that those children "are 
born with methyl groups stripped from several genes involved in growth 
and metabolic control, with the result that they are predisposed to 
conserving energy".70 All organisms, then, acquire subtle changes to the way 
in which their genes are expressed as they move through life. Some of these 
changes might be positive or neutral, and some can cause harm.71 Most 
c,~ Jade Johnsron, "Lamarck Lives! 'l 'he Epigenetic Revol mi on in Environmemal Health" 
(16 January 2010), Health cir Environment (blog), online: <healthandenvironmemblog 
.wordpress.com/issue-archive/ epigenetics> (quoting Dr. Thea Edwards). 
69 Tohnston, supra note 68 (citing Thea ~I Edwards & John Peterson Myers, 
"Environmental Exposures and Gene Regulation in Disease Etiology" (2007) 115:9 
Envtl Healtl1 Perpectives 1264 at 1264, online at <https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/ articles/ l'l\IC:l 964917 /> ). 
70 
71 
Lisa A Joss-Moore & Robert H Lane, "Epigenetics and tl1e Developmental Origins of 
Disease: The Key to Unlocking rhc Door of Personalized Medicine" (2012) 4:5 
Epigenomics 47 1. 
Assessmenrs of what consrirures a positive, neurral, or harmful effect may be deeply 
political and interlaced with the social context that affected individuals and 
communities must navigate. See e.g. Part rv.B, below. 
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relevant for our purposes are the data showing that exposures to 
environmental chemicals can alter DNA tagging patterns, including those 
effecting fertility, "[and] we don't know what it would take to get the tags 
back to their original form" -or even whether such reversal would 
be desirable.72 
What scientists worry about, and what might be important for theorists 
of intergenerational justice, is the possibility for "mismatches between what 
has been pre-programmed during development and what is encountered in 
the real world".7 ' These changes include alterations in protein 
concentrations, cell metabolism and differentiation. They are not 
immediately identifiable in the "new generation", buc may lead to an 
increased disease burden later in life. Significantly, these effects will not 
impact everyone equally-not only because existing social stratification will 
structure exposures-but because some of these DNA tags may require a 
particular environmental or physiological trigger in orderro manifest. Thus, 
we are confronted here with multiple levels of uncertainty-about the 
relationship between chemicals and contemporary bodies, between 
chemicals and future bodies, and about the unknown ways in which 
chemically-infused contemporary and future bodies interact with their 
environments and societies-environments and societies which, for future 
bodies at least, we can only imagine. 
III. THE ORTHODOX ACCOUNT OF 
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 
Prevailing western political and legal theories and institutions are not 
well-suited to addressing the effects of contemporary choices on persons 
who do not yet exist, or who may never come into being.7' Philosophers in 
this tradition have long debated whether it is even coherent to view future 
~2 Johnston, supra note 68. l)n \vhether such changes are "desirable", see ibid. 
73 
"Epigcncrics and the l)cvclopn1cnral ()rigins ofl)iscasc" ( 12 ()ctobcr 2012) Health & 
Environment(blog), online: <healthandenvironmentblog.wordpress.com/2012/ I 0/ 12/ 
ep i genetics-an d-the-devel opm ental-o d gins-of-disease> . 
7
' On the challenges posed for democrac~· in particular, see supm note 6. 
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persons as objects of justice or moral consideration.'' Our focus in this 
section is on the legallicerature on intergenerational justice, which generally 
accepts (as we do) the assumption chat we do owe moral and political 
obligations to future persons. The orthodox (legal) literature on 
intergenerational justice takes up a particular version of these obligations, 
grounded in the principles of"intergenerational equity" advanced by Edith 
Brown Weiss in her influential book, In Fairness to Future Generations. 
The basic premise of intergenerational equity, as elaborated by Brown 
Weiss, is that the present generation is both entitled to benefit from the 
natural environment, and obligated to preserve the environment for future 
generations.76 In elaborating chis obligation, Brown Weiss draws on 
traditional liberal political theory, proposing chat we might use a Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance to "assume the perspective of a generation that is placed 
somewhere along the spectrum of time, but does not know in advance 
where it will be located."77 But given the uneven distribution of toxic 
exposures and effects canvassed in the preceding section, how helpful is it to 
imagine any given generation as having a singular identifiable perspective or 
interest respecting the regulation oftoxics? Feminist and relational theorists 
have long challenged Rawls' veil of ignorance on the basis that there can be 
no unsituated perspective of the kind Rawls asks us to imagine; the realities 
., A necessarily incomplece listing of che vase literacure engaging chese quescions includes 
Derek Parflt, Reasons and Per:wn.i (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wilfred 
Beckerman, "The Impossibility of a Theory ofintergenerational Justice'' in Joerg Chet 
Tremmel, ed, Handbook oflntngenerationa/]ustiff (Northampton, l\fA: Edward Elgar, 
2006); Ernest Partridge, "On the Rights ofFurure Generations" in Donald Scherer, ed, 
Upstream/Downstream: lssut:sinEnvironmentalEthics (Philadelphia: 'lC:mple Universicy 
Press, 1990). For an introductory overview of these philosophical debates, see Lukas H 
Meyer, "Intergenerational Justice" in Edward N Zalta, ed, The St.mfordEnrydopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), <plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ sum2016/ entl'ies/ 
justice-intergeneration al>. 
Brown Weiss, ln Fairness, supra note 7 at 21. 
Ibid at 24, citing.John Ra;v]s, A Theory oj]ustice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1971). 
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of embodied diversity cast doubt on Rawls' heuristic, even when it is 
confined to assessing outcomes in a single political moment." 
Having id en rifled "generations" as her core unit of analysis, Brown Weiss 
advocates "a minimum level of equality among generations':79 and elaborates 
three core "principles" of intergenerational equity: 
First, each generation should be required to conserve the diversity of the 
natural and cultural resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict the 
options available to future generations in solving their problems and 
satisfying their own values, and should be entitled to diversity comparable 
to that of previous generations. This principle may be called "conservation 
o.f'options." Second, each generation should be required to maintain the 
quality of the planet so that it is passed on in no worse condition than the 
present generation received it, and should be entitled to a quality of the 
planet comparable to the one enjoyed by previous generations. This is the 
principle of"crmservatirm rf quality." Third, each generation should provide 
its members with equitable rights of access to the legacy from past 
generations and should conserve this access for future generations. This is 
the principle of" conservation ofaaess:'80 
Although we will criticize aspects of this formulation, we do not aim to 
undermine the common-sense appeal of these directives. If prevailing 
modes of governance throughout the Global North honoured these 
principles in practice, we would regard chis as a significant improvement 
over the current state of affairs. Nonetheless, we are skeptical that an 
approach which treats intra- and intergenerational problems in separate 
silos will be capable of grounding the ethical and political orientation 
78 
8D 
Sec e.g. Christine M Koggcl, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contmct 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988 ); Susan Moller Okin, Gender,Justice and the 
Fami(y (New York: Basic Books, 1989). ror a discussion of intergenerational justice in 
the works of Rawls and other philosophers operating in the Rawlsian tradition, see 
David Heyd, "A Value or an Ohligarion? Rawls on Justice ro Fururc Generations" in 
Axel Gosseries & Lukas H Meyer, eds, lnte1generationalJustic1~ (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
Brown Weiss, Jn Fairness, supra noce 7 at 24-25. 
Ibid at 38 [emphasis added]. 
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necessary to restructuring social practices likely co cause short-term and 
long-term harms. To that end, we note that only the third of Brown Weiss's 
principles embraces "justice between generations and between memhers of 
the same generation."81 As such, it is the only principle that invites 
consideration of past, present, or future social conditions of difference 
and inequality. 
Brown Weiss's model has already attracted criticism for d1e "relative 
underdevelopment of intra-generational equity".82 Catherine Redgwell has 
noted, as a quantitative matter, that Brown Weiss only directly engages wid1 
intra-generational equity concerns at seven points in the entire text of In 
Fairness to Future Generations." Lynda Collins maintains that, while 
valid, this critique is not fatal to the project, since Brown Weiss's d1eorycan 
be productively enriched by explicit incorporation of equity concerns.s4 For 
Collins, the primary difficulcy arising from inadequate attention to 
intra-generational equity lies in the face that "characterizing 
intra-generational equity as a component of intergenerational equity 
obscures the real potential for conflict between the present and future."~' 
Brown Weiss does appear to deal somewhat perfunctorily with the 
possibility of such conflict. In one summary of her theory, Brown Weiss 
notes first that such conflicts may be illusory since "poverty is a major cause 
of ecological degradation:' and that "meeting the basic needs of d1e poor" is 
essential to ensuring that "they will have both the desire and ability to fulfil 
their intergenerational obligations to conserve the planet."s6 In cases of true 
81 
8.; 
Edith Brown \Veiss, "Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global 
Environmenral Change" in Edirh Brown W'Ciss, ed, Environmental Change and 
lnternation.-d LaUJ: NeUJ Ch1dlenge_,. and Dimensions (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 1992) 385 ar 405 [emphasis added] [Brown Weiss, "Inrergcnerarional Equiry"]. 
Lynda M Collins, "Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in Global 
Environmental Governance" (2007) 30:1 Dal LJ 79 at 116. 
See Catherine Redgwell, lntergenemtional Trust_,. and Environment1zl Protection 
(Manchester: University Press, 1999) at 109, n 208. 
Collins, supra narc 82 at 116. 
~' Jhid. 
86 Brown Weiss, "Intergenerational Equity", supra note 81 at 398. 
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conflict, Brown Weiss remarks only that "we need to develop appropriate 
mechanisms and allocate sufficient resources to maximize the ability to 
both "alleviate poverty as quickly as possible" and "protect the health of the 
planet for future generations."87 More generally, Brown Weiss does not 
appear to move beyond generalized exhortations that "all members of the 
present generation are entitled to equitable access to the legacy" of the 
environment, and the insistence that "[i]nrragenerational justice requires 
wealthier communities to assist impoverished ones in realizing such 
access.""8 There is no suggestion in Brown Weiss's text that the experiences 
of the "impoverished" should be solicited or addressed (beyond what is 
required for the purpose of resource conservation), or that we ought to 
question or reform the underlying structures which produce the inequalities 
she observes.89 
Law and development scholar Graham Mayeda develops a related 
critique of Brown Weiss's approach. At the heart ofMayeda's challenge to 
Brown Weiss is a concern that her focus on equality between "generations" 
is "essentialist": 
87 
This is because the principle of inter-generational equity denies the 
complexity of particular historical relationships .... It does so by conceiving 
sustainability in terms of the relationship between abstract groups, such as 
generarions, resulting in a concept of "equity" that is formalistic, being 
based solely on the idea of the equitable distribution of natural resources, 
and which reinforces rather than challenges present distributions 
ofgoods.90 
Ibid. 
Brnwn \\Tciss, ln Fairness, supra norc 7 at 28. 
For a similar criticism, sec Ruth Gordon, "Urnustainahlc Development" in Shawkar 
Alam et al, eds, lntt:mational Environmental Law and tht: Global South (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015) SO (asserting that "the concept of sustainable 
development was conceived in large parr to engage the global South in ecological 
discourse, nor to fun darn email y question global North understandings of development 
and economic growth" at 62). 
Graham ;\fayeda, "Where Should Johannesburg Take Us?: Ethical and Legal 
Approaches to Sustainable Development in the Context oflnternational Environmental 
Law" (2004) 15:1 Colo J Inr'l Envtl L & Pol'y 29 at 49-50. Sec also Carmen G 
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While Mayeda's focus is on the differing circumstances of richer and 
poorer nations;'' his argument remains salient in respect of domestic 
environmental policy choices within diverse contemporary polities. Even 
setting aside Collins' concerns regarding possible conflicts between the 
interests of present and future generations, Mayeda's critique points to the 
thorny reality that "past'; "present", and "future" are each themselves 
constituted by conflicts and complexities-all of which are deeply 
interlaced wid1in and across temporal moments. 
Demographic patterns of BFR and phthalate exposure are a case in 
point. The social conditions-housing stock, air quality, education, 
political voice, and financial access to "safe" consumer choices-which have 
likely contributed to differential exposure patterns are profoundly 
influenced by historical economic and social conditions of inequality.92 In 
the present moment, those subject to heightened exposure necessarily 
experience any resulting effects (consciously or not) as part of a broader 
constellation of social, economic, and environmental experiences; exposure 
effects that may arise in future generations will be similarly shaped by the 
deep and immediate past, and the specific social and material circumstances 
of future lives and communities. The possible harms of exposure-and, 
consequently, the most productive forms of prevention and redress-will 
necessarily be tied to broad social relationships associated with race, gender, 
ability, and social and economic stratification. These problems thus call for 
responses grounded in an understanding of human persons and 
communities as em bodied, diverse, and constituted by their social, 
historical, ecological, and material circumstances. The balance of d1is paper 
will seek to elaborate a theory capable of grounding such responses. 
91 
Gonzalez, "FnvironmcnralJusricc and International Fnvironmcnral Law" in Shawkar 
Alam et al, eds, Routlulge Handbook oflnternational Environmental Law (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013). 
Mayeda, supra note 90 at 57. 
See e.g. Pulido, supra note 17. 
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IV. TOW ARD A RELATIONAL THEORY OF 
INTERGENERATION AL JUSTICE 
Scholars operating in a relational theoretical mode have endeavoured to 
bring attention to the embodied, affective, and social dimensions of 
problems ranging from domestic violence/ 1 to education policy,9' to health 
care.95 A central catalyst for the development of relational approaches has 
been the perception that traditional liberal legalism is founded on a 
fundamentally mistaken understanding of the human person as an 
"abstracted, disembodied, rational, universal rights bearing, contracting, 
possessive individual".96 In this regard, relational theory may be understood 
as part of a broader set of intellectual projects d1at have sought to 
challenge "the liberal humanist construction of a universal, coherent, and 
self-constituting subject."97 Relational theorists instead urge that interests, 
aspirations, and capacities are both {Orged in relation to other persons, and 
realized through relations with other persons.98 These relations include 
interpersonal relationships such as those with family, friends, or co-workers; 
as well as institutional or structural relationships such as those defined by 
~3 Jennifer Ncdclsky, Lau/r Relations: _.d Relational Theory o_f,Se[f; Llutonomy) and L aw 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) ch 5 at 200ff 
9\ 
96 
Martha Mi now, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
Sue Sherwin. "A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Healthcare" in Elisabeth 
Boett.kes & Wilfrid] \X'aluchow, eds. Readings in Health Care Ethics (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2000) 69 at 69. 
Roxanne Mykitiuk, "Fragmencingrhe Body" (1994) 2:1 AusdFem LJ 63 at79. See also 
N edelsky, supra note 93 ch 4 at l 58ff; Robert Leckey, Contextual Subjects: Famdy, State 
and Relational Th1~ory ('foronto: University of 'foronto Press, 2008) (setting om d1e 
relational critique, as well as argumems that relational d1eorists may present an unfair 
caricature ofliberal legalism at 8-9). 
Lcckcy, supra note 96 at 3. 
98 Tenn i fer J LI ewell yn & Jocelyn Downie, "Introduction" in Jennifer J Llewellyn & Jocelyn 
Downie, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Reltltional Theory and H ealth Law 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012) 1at4. 
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race, capitalism, or the bureaucratic stateY'' Two crucial consequences of this 
relational oncology, which will be explored in turn below, are ( 1) an 
acceptance that "autonomy" is a value or capacity forged in relation with 
ochers, not an exercise of total "control" by a separate self; and (2) an 
awareness that individual perspectives are deeply shaped by social and 
embodied determinants, such that there is no such thing as an "unsituated" 
standpoint-the views and experiences of actual diverse persons and 
communities must be solicited in order co adequately comprehend social 
choices and generate appropriate regulatory responses. 
This relational vision of persons as inherently situated, embodied, 
interconnected, and interdependent has offered a much-needed corrective 
to the unsituated, disembodied, isolated, and freely-contracting individual 
ofliberal theory. But more work needs to be done to elaborate a relational 
theory chat poses an equivalent challenge to the identifiable, separable, 
undifferentiated "generation" of the orthodox intergenerational justice 
literature. Existing relational literature already frequently invokes imagery 
and policy analyses that allude to social interconnections over time, making 
Nedelsky, supra note 93 at 4. Of course, the body of relational theory we cite here is not 
the first or the only intellectual tradition that has emphasized interconnection and 
relat ionship as cencral tenets. For example, Gordon Christie notes that: 
[Tl ndividuals in Aboriginal societies are seen as interwoven into intric;1te \.vebs ofreLuionships, 
the self being defined in it s rel.it ion to others ... individuals ;<re conceptualized in Aboriginal 
societies as nod,...- in these wehs, as relatively (i.w·d,md determined beings connected by srrand1 of 
the web. The identity of these individuals (and the various communities they collectively 
comprise) is provided by the responsibilities they have, which work to we;\Ve the web of which 
they are parts. T here are, quite simply, things the individual must do, responsibilities to fam ily, 
clan and community that must be respected and that mw t lead to action. Responsibilities act to 
define a core of che identity of the individual, jusc as the existence of a society centred around 
responsibilities define.1 the identity of Aboriginal communities. 
Gordon Christie, "Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples (2003) 2: 1 Indigenous LJ 67 at 
110-11 I emphasis in original]. The Indigenous legal cheory Christie describes differs in 
important respects from the relational theory set om here-for example, in describing 
persons as "nodes'' or "fixed and determined beings" rather than (as relational theorists 
would have it) as continuously constituted and reconstituted by their relationships 
(supra note 98 and accompanying text); and in describing persons as bound by things 
which they "must'' do, as opposed to the relational conception of rights and 
responsibilities as being open ro constant social contcstation and redefinition (infra note 
135 and accompanying text). 
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this body of scholarship a fruitful starting point for theorizing 
intergenerational justice. One of Jennifer Nedelsky's most compelling and 
personal challenges to the liberal vision of the singular, bounded self is her 
experience of interconnection with her own young and unborn children. 10 '' 
Moreover, the lives and choices of previous generations are consistently 
present in the relational construction of contemporary problems, and the 
common relational focus on root structural change implies a prescriptive 
vision concerned with the interests of future persons.101 But the problems 
posed by everyday toxics require a more focused and deliberate reckoning 
with the puzzles of intergenerational justice than these treatments offer. 
The following sections explore the contributions that two bodies of 
scholarship might make m developing a relational account of 
intergenerational justice. First, we explore how the problem of 
everyday toxic exposure calls on us to deepen the relational critique of 
autonomy-as-control. Drawing on recent scholarship in materialfiminism, 
we argue that everyday toxic exposure demands that relational theory 
expand the sphere of "relationships" conditioning autonomy to include 
complex and unpredictable forms of "agency" exhibited by matter, 
ecologies, and chemical flows. Second, we consider the implications of the 
relational mandate to consider diverse perspectives as applied on an 
intergenerational scale wherein future persons and communities cannot 
express their experiences directly. To this end, we suggest that engaging 
diverse contemporary perspectives on futurity is a crucial component of 
relational intergenerational justice. We may temper the unknowability of 
future persons by developing more relational accounts that consider diverse, 
situated contemporary perspectives as to the values and priorities that 
ought to shape our obligations through time. To this end, we take the 
literature on critical disability studies as a guide, illuminating the 
intergenerational dimensions of the imperative to foster social norms that 
are welcoming of embodied difference. As we consider the possible 
100 Nedelsky, supra note 93 at 111. 
lOJ See generally Nedelsky, supra noce 93; Colleen Sheppard, Jndusive };'quality: The 
Relational Dimensions 1!(Systemic Discrimination in Ciw11da (Monrreal & Kingsron: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010). 
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fixed characteristic of persons, autonomy is cast as a capacity that can be 
developed or thwarted by an individual's specific circumstances.10' This 
reconceptualization of autonomy unsettles the widespread association 
between "autonomy" and "control", since 
[ w ]hen we focus on the relationships that make autonomy possible, we 
muse recognize that we do not choose many of the relationships most 
central in developing our capacity for autonomy .... [\XT]c arc forced to 
recognize both the interdependence that makes autonomy possible and our 
lack of control over it. '06 
Legal scholarship in relational theory has demonstrated that social 
relationships, both interpersonal and structural, can condition the 
autonomy of individuals, but it has not explored in depth the way that 
ecological or material relations might do so.107 Material feminists have 
proposed that chemicals moving through environments might be best 
understood as "actants" exhibiting a form of "agency", behaving in 
unpredictable ways that shape and condition our autonomy-in effect, tl1at 
ios See e.g. Sherwin, supra note I 02 at 13, 26; and lvfackenzie & Stoljar, supm note I 02 
at 22. 
106 See Nedelsky, supra note 93 at 278, 292. Nedelsky does not deny the importance of 
"consciously formulating intentions and hopes and trying to shape one's life 
accordingly'', but rather believes that the language of "control" is not an optimal 
descripcor for such auconomy, since it fails to "engage wirh difference in a way that 
advances equality." Ibid at 292 and 278. 
107 But sec Harris, supra note 1 at 114 (describing the "'environmentally embedded' subject" 
in rhe context of "vulnerability" theory). L1digcnous scholarship in a range of fields 
including sociology and anthropology has long emphasized the "embeddedness of 
humans and animals in shared social, cultural, political, and economic relationships", as 
well as recognized agency for rhe 'n10re-than-hum,rn' world: Zoe Todd, "Fish Pluralities: 
Human-Animal Relations and Sites of Engagement in Paulatuuq, Arctic Canada" 
(2014) 38:1-2 Cultures Inuit, Gouvernance et Cosmopolitiques 217 at 232. 
Furthermore, this rclationali ry has been recognized as a fundamental characteristic of 
the Indigenous legal orders that are living and practiced today, despite their subjugation 
to Canadian coloniallaw. See e.g. Saral1 Hunt, "Ontologies oflndigeneity: The Politics 
of Embodying a Concept" (2014) 21 : 1 Cul rural Geographies 27; John Borrows, "Living 
Between \Vater and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning, and Democracy'' 
(1997) 47:4 U'l'LJ 417. 
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our relevant relations are not just with each other, bur also with and 
through the material world. Because these materials may operate in ways 
that impact the possible:: descendants of those exposed, the legal 
subject becomes cognizable as a link in a chain of bodies that spans 
generations-as at once a moral end and a vessel for chemical intensities 
and flows.108 Existing relational frameworks capture structural relations that 
include broad institutional and economic forces, and our modified version 
would further incorporate ecological realities and broader time horizons so 
as to account for social and "material systems in their complex 
interlocking totality."109 
Material feminists pursue a range of scholarly and political 
commitments, but significantly for our purposes, share a core focus on the 
dynamism and social relevance of "things themselves''.110 In many ways, 
to8 See Jessica Eisen, "Beyond Rights and \Velfare: Democracy, Dialogue and the Animal 
V?clfarc Act" 51: 1 :i\1ich JL Reform [forthcoming in 2018] (on the relational imperative 
to view persons as both means and ends) . 
io; Elisabeth Grosz, The Nick of"Time: Politics, Evolution and the Untimely (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004) at 198. Nedelskydraws on scientific approaches to "the natural 
world"-for example "genetic mutation" -as constituting a "completely different 
context" that nonetheless illuminates the social phenomena she describes. See Nedelsky, 
supra narc 93 at 57 . Elsewhere, Ncdclsky describes the networks and behaviours of 
material actanrs as intersecting with social relationships, but primarily treats scientific 
accounts of these networks and behaviours as sources of useful metaphors for the social 
relationships that form her primary area of inquiry: Jennifer Nedelsky, "Relational 
Autonomy and the Trap of Social Determinism: Perspectives from Science and 
Theology" (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors). \'\'e want to extend 
relational theory by suggesting that genetic mutations and other phenomena of the 
natural (and synrhetic) world arc nor "completely diffcrcnr", nor simply a source of 
metaphor for social relations, but are rather core dimensions of social life 
and relationship. 
uo See generally Jane Bennett, Vibrant lvtatter: A Political Ecology qf"Things (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004). Note that the "material feminist" literature to which we 
refer is a distinct field from the Marxist "materialist feminism". Sracy Alaimo and Susan 
Hekman explain: 
It is important to distinguish what we arc calling 'material fcn1inism' -\vhich is crncrging 
primarily from corporeal fon1inism. cnvironn1cnral fcminisn1 , and science srudics-frmn 
'111atnialist' fe1ninis1n, which e1nnges fron1, or is synonyn1ous with ~larxist fcn1inisn1 . .Even as 
many of tht theorists ofw hat wt art calling 'mattrial fnninism" havt been intluenctd by Marxist 
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material feminists writing in this mode are reacting to what they view as an 
erasure of the active materiality of our world.1H The concern is that much 
feminist analysis occurs at the level of" culture," "language;' and "discourse;' 
working to "foreclose attention to lived, material bodies", as well as the bio-
physical and ecological environments in which we are immersed and 
embedded.112 Approaches which treat culture as distinct from nature limit 
us in that they apply "a framework that situates ... the environment, outside 
of human and social interactions".' " 
It would overstate the case to suggest that relational theorists have so far 
treated social and environmental interactions in completely discrete silos.114 
thwry, post· Marxism, and cultural studios, their dtfinition of 'materiality' is not, or is not 
exclusively, Marxist. 
Sc:acy Alaimo & Susan Hekman, "Introduction: Emerging Models of Macerialicy in 
Feminist Theory" [Alaimo & Hekman, "Introduction"] in Stacy Alaimo & Susan 
Hekman, eds, Afateri1d Feminism; (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) 1 
[Alaimo & Hekman, l1-ft1teria~ at 18, n 3. There arc commonalities between work in the 
material feminist mode and "new materialisms" as well. Jane Hcnncrr elaborates that, 
"[i]t is important to follow the trail ofhurnan power to expose social hegemonies (as 
historical materialists do). Hur my contention is that there is also public value in 
following the scent of a [non-human], thingly power, the material agency of natural 
bodies and technological artifacts." Hcnncrr, ;upm note 110 at xiii. 
111 See Stacy Alaimo, "Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature" in 
Alaimo & Hekman, Af11terial, supm note 110 at 237 [Alaimo, "Trans-Corporeal 
Feminisms"]; Nancy 'lba.na, "Viscous Porosity: \Vicnessing Katrina" in Alaimo & 
Hekman, Material, supm note 110, 188 at 188. 
112 Alaimo & Hekman, "Introduction'; supra note 110, 1 at 1-4. One of the earliest and 
most consistent feminist critics of the postmodern trend in feminism has been 
Catharine lvfacKinnon. See e.g. ;\facKinnon, «Points Against Postrnodernisrn", (2000) 
75 :3 Chicago-Kenc L Rev 687. 'l 'he material feminist literarnre differs from MacKinnon 
in its assessment of the usefulness of postmodern analysis. Sec e.g. Alaimo & H ekman, 
"Introduccion", supra .note 110 (insisting that the material feminist critique of 
postmodernism does not entail "a return to modernism", but rather seeks "a 
de construction of the material/ discursive dichoromythat re rains both clements wirhour 
privileging either'' at 6) . 
ll.J Scott, Haw & Lee, supm note 53 at 11. 
11
' Sec e.g. Ncdclsky, supra note 93 ("I sec a link between the [dominant conception of a] 
disembodied subject and one of che most fundamental and neglected relationships, thac 
of human beings ro earth and to the other beings who inhabit it with us .... In an 
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Existing relational accounts, however, have not seriously engaged with the 
ways in which social relationships include, and are mediated through, 
physical elements from the micro (chemicals) to the macro (environments, 
including toxic environments). Material feminists offer some helpful tools 
for such an inquiry, as they begin with the position that, just as individuals 
cannot pre-exist their sociality, they cannot pre-exist ecological or material 
relationality. As Jane Bennett explains, "[t]his material vitality is me, it 
predates me, it exceeds me, it postdates me". 11 5 A body is always "modulating 
with its environments". 116 The living and the material, subjects and objects, 
the social and the natural are always mutually co-constiruting.w 
As we have seen in respect to BFRs and phthalates, the very presence 
(and the specific concentrations) of these toxics in the environment is 
"influenced by social dynamics and technology, and by economic and 
political factors favouring the industries that produce and emit them. Thus, 
political and social factors have a direct role in the material (i.e., chemical) 
composition of the environment, and accordingly, our material bodies".rn 
Nancy Tuana, for example, has described how phthalates move from the 
PVC manufacturing plants in Louisiana into the flesh of the workers and 
nearby residents, demonstrating the ongoing, continual exchange between 
material bodies and the environment. 11" Phthalates are released into air and 
leach from PVC plumbing into water; they make their way across 
membranes and into bodies, tissues, and cells; and they bind to receptors, 
mimicking hormones and triggering metabolic processes. In this way, the 
optimal rclarional approach, our place in rhe ecology of earth would be recognized as a 
relationship that shapes and is shaped by all others'' at 34). 
115 Bennett, supra note 110 at 120. 
u G Milla Tiainen, Karve-Kaisa Komruri & Ilona Hongisto, "framing, rollowing, 
J\fiddling: Towards Methodologies of Relational Materialitics" (2015) 21 :2 Cultural 
Studies Rev 14 at 15. 
117 See Bennett, supra note 110 ("[a]n actant never really acts alone. Its efficacy or agency 
always depends on the collaboration, cooperation, or interactive interference of many 
bodies and forces" ar 21). 
us See Score, Haw & Lee, supra note 53 ar 332. 
11
" Tuana, supm note 111 at 200. 
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escapingphthalate molecules lead to specific, uninvited material changes to 
people's bodies with real consequences for their health and well-being, and 
that of their possible future children. This would also be true for 
BFRs, which typically enter bodies through inadvertent ingestion, as we 
gather those molecules under our fingernails from our computers and house 
dust, and then put our hands to our mouths. BFRs ultimately collect and 
are stored in our fatty tissues. Because they bioaccumulate in the body, 
"BFRs can be thought to create a fleshy material archive of one's social 
location, practices, and movements. Not only are bodies embedded in 
social contexts and structures, but the social is also embedded, literally, in 
material bodies".' :o 
Accounting for the agentic qualities of matter gives rise to a profound 
iteration of a problem at the heart of relational theory: confronting 
cosmological and epistemological indeterminacy-and the attendant lack 
of "control" over environments and material actors-with "receptivity, 
acceptance, attentiveness, and creative responsiveness': rather than defeatism 
and nihilism.i:i With reference to the body, Nedelsky notes that"[ w Je did 
not create and cannot ultimately control our bodies, just as we did not 
create and cannot control the world we live in. Bur we are responsible for 
our bodies (and our world)". 122 
As the integrity of boundaries between human bodies and the material 
world destabilizes, conventional understandings of human agency and 
material absence-~fagency come into question.m Liberal theory takes the 
individual human person to have agency, while elements of the non-human, 
120 Scott, Ha'v & Lee, supra note 53 at 333. 
121 Ncdclsky, supra norc 93 at 288. 
122 Jhid at 279-80. 
123 In much of rhc material feminist lircraturc, the "human" and "non-human" arc 
transposed, with no serious attention to where animals fit in to the world they describe. 
Animals are, of course, affected by toxics, often in devastating ways. See Valerie Brown, 
"Causes for Concern: Chemicals and \'Vildlife", TVorld TVildjireFund (December 2003 ), 
online: <d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/ causesforconcern.pdf>. Our 
political and legal systems have proven notoriously deficient in protecting animal 
interests in this regard, as in others. See generally Bisgould, supra note 43. 
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bio-physical, or material world are seen as non-agentic; chey are presumed 
to passively follow natural "laws" or be acted upon by humans. 12 ' But 
material frminists argue that even matter is not always inert and that human 
corporeality continuously interacts with d1e materiality of d1e environment, 
a phenomenon that Stacy Alaimo refers to as "trans-corporeality". 125 Thus, 
agency is not thought to be exclusive to human or even living beings, but 
must also be applied to the intra-active and reactive, responsive materiality 
of things and environments. As Bennett says, "[t]his understanding of 
agency does not deny che existence of that thrust called intentionality, buc it 
does see it as less definitive of outcomes".126 Circling back to the relational 
theoretical critique of autonomy-as-control in the context of social 
relationships, the insights of feminist materialists call upon us to confront 
the cask of defining politically desirable autonomy in a world where subjects 
are in a state of constant interpenetration with agentic materials that often 
seem to defy our immediate perception, lee alone "control". 
The idea of a "toxic trespass", for example, posits that synthetic 
chemicals now routinely and freely cross bodily boundaries and enter the 
cells, tissues, and organs of people living in the industrialized world. 127 
Seim tists trying to popularize understandings of endocrine disruptors often 
describe these synthetic chemicals as "messengers" that mimic hormone 
action by "moving through the body, picking up 'packages' from the 
t24 Alaimo,'" frans-Corporeal reminisms", supm note 111. The failure co accribme even the 
most basic justiciable interests to animals or environments may be seen as flowing from 
some version of chis liberal premise. ({Laurence H Tribe, "\X'.tys Nor to Think About 
Plastic Trees: N cw Foundations for Environmental Law" ( 197 4) 83:7 Yale LJ 1315. For 
this reason, some efforts to include animals in the legal category of "persons" have 
focused on proving that animals are capable of rdevam forms and degrees of 
"autonomy". See e.g. Steven Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rightsjor Animal> 
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000 ); Steven Wise, Drawing the Line: Sciena; and 
the Ciisefi;r Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002). 
12s Alaimo, "Ti-ans-Corporeal Feminisms", supra note 111at238. 
1it1 Bennett, supra note 110 at 32. 
m See Toxic Tre.1pass, 2007, DVD (Ottawa: Nationalhlm Board, 2007); Helen Pearman 
Ziral & Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg, "Help! Our Toxic Environment is Killing Our 
Children" (2011) 2:1J Motherhood Initiative 102. 
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'outside', delivering them to receptive agents [on the 'inside'], igniting and 
transforming productive processes". m Othertimes a lock-and-key metaphor 
is employed. All three of these images (the trespasser, messenger, and lock-
and-key) evoke a misleading sense of boundary between body and 
environment-albeit a boundary which may be breached. The reality, also 
invoked by these same metaphors, is that "bodies are in dynamic 
relationships of exchange wid1 environments, and constantly in flux.''m As 
Max Liboiron says, synthetic hormones actually "participate in the body's 
endocrine, or hormone, system".1w In coming to realize that uninvited 
changes to our endocrine systems by everyday toxics have "real, tangible, 
material consequences for bodies",131 and corresponding effects on health 
and reproduction, it becomes obvious that these exposures could impact 
our abilities to work, thrive, reproduce, and choose, now and in the future. 
Thus, as much as these synthetic chemical actors might lack intention, and 
their precise movements may be unpredictable and beyond anyone's 
control, we have to admit that the movements of these "enigmatic, active 
Others"rn are conditioning the agency of human actors. 
13. PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURI'l'Y: WELCOMING BODILY DIVERSITY 
A core methodological and epistemological imperative supporting 
relational theory's more social vision of autonomy is the insistence that 
theory and policy must be grounded in dialogue between diverse persons 
and groups, each of which brings to bear their own unique perspectives. 
128 Dayna Nadine Scott, "Pollution and the Body Boundary: Exploring Scale, Gender and 
Remedy" in Janice Richardson & Erika Rackley. eds, Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law 
(Nnv York: Routledge, 2012) ar 67. 
129 Scorr, Haw & Lee, supra nore 53 ar 332. 
13
'
0 Max Liboiron, "Plasticizers: A T,venty~First Century ?vfiasn1a" inJennifet Gabrys, Gay 
Hawkins & Mike :i\1ichacl, eds, /lccumulation: The Af11teri11/ Politics 1!( Plastic (New 
York: Routledge, 2013) ar 140 I emphasis added]. 
ui Dayna Nadine Scorr, '"Gender-Benders': Sex and Law in the Constitution of Polluted 
Bodies" (2009) 17 :3 Fem Leg Srud 241at256 [Scott, "'Gender Benders"']. 
102 Cate Sa.ndilands, The Good-Natured Feminist (Minneapolis: University of.Minnesota 
Press, 1999) 181. 
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This can encompass Martha Minow's effort to "solici[ t J challenges from the 
perspective of those labeled different", rn as well as Christine Koggd's call to 
foster "genuine interactions, ones in which the dominant and powerful 
recognize the validity and value of the different perspectives" of oppressed 
persons. '·;i Rights, values, and social norms are all understood by relational 
theorists to be social choices, each of which in turn shapes our 
opportunities for autonomous choice across a range of interpersonal and 
institutional contexts. m The relational route to justice thus requires that 
particular voices-especially chose that have been traditionally overlooked 
or marginalized-be included in democratic dialogues regarding the 
policies, laws, and rights that shape people's lives and opportunities. 
At first blush, this may seem to pose an insurmountable challenge when 
applied to persons who do not yet exist, or may never come into being. The 
orthodox intergenerational justice literature is replete with references to the 
unknowability offuture persons and communities, and the suggestion diac 
what is in fact known or knowable about future generations might be 
limited only to the "objectively" discernible basic needs of biological 
persons.u6 But the relational insight that all perspectives are situated casts 
doubt on the prospects for such objectivity and demands more careful 
consideration of the tools at our disposal for understanding future persons, 
their likely relationships with each other, and with past and contemporary 
communities and individuals. 
While we may be unable to seek the direct input offuture persons, d1is 
does not limit our conceptions of intergenerational justice to bare claims 
1
,_; lvfino\V1 supra note 94 at 112. 
u4 Koggd, supra note 78 ac 193. 
13
'
5 Nedd sky, suprd note 93 at 65, 249; Kogge1 supr,t note 78 at 202-03; Min ow, supra note 
94 ar 309. 
13
"' l':fBrown \t\/eissJn fairness, supm note 7 ar 39 (positing rhar "[i]r would be difficult, if 
nor impossible, ro predict [ rhe preferences of future generations], eirher because rheir 
values, and hence their preferences. will change over time. or because technological 
developments may change the options available to them upon which they will base their 
preferences'; thus limi ring inrergenerarional obligations ro a minimal core of ensuring "a 
reasonably secure and flexible natural and cultural resource base for future generations 
and a reasonably decent and healthy human environm~nt for the present generation:') 
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about the objective interests of future persons. Instead, a relational account 
of intergenerational justice demands that we solicit diverse past and 
contemporary perspectives on futurity, and take these seriously in defining 
our obligations to future persons and communities. The term "futurity" 
often appears in the intergenerational justice literature without explicit 
definition.'·;7 The Oxford Dictionary of Environment and Conservation 
offers a spare, apolitical definition:"[ i] n the future, yet to come."rn In other 
fields of social discourse, however, the term "futurity" is imbued with the 
particular hopes and fears of diverse constituencies, and is deeply 
interwoven with social and material forces past and present. Andrew 
Baldwin summarizes that "the future is rendered knowable through specific 
practices (i.e., calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, 
intervenes on the present through ... anticipatory logics".1'9 He elaborates 
that "[f]uturity is also an important feacure of the affective dimensions of 
daily life" including"fear" and "hope".110 On such accounts, what is "[i]n the 
future, yet to come" is not an empty signifier of passing hours, days, and 
years, but is instead heavy with specific anxieties and expectations relating 
u7 See e.g. Dobson~ supra note I 0. 
us Chris Park & MichaelAI!aby, Dictionary o/Environment and Conservation. 3d ed (New 
York: Oxford Universiry Press, 2017), sub verbo "fumriry". C.,]'Gregory Kavka. "The 
Futurity Problem" in RI Sikora & Brian Barry, eds, Obligations to Future Generations 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978) 186 ar 187 (using rhe phrase "the 
rucuriry Problem" ro describe the abstract question of whether "the interests of future 
strangers I are J worthy of equal consideration with chose of presently existing strangers?" 
[emphasis in the original]). 
u9 Andrew Baldwin, "\Vhiteness and ruturity: 'fowards a Research Agenda" (2012) 36:2 
Progress Human Geography 172 at 173, citing Ben Anderson, "l'rccmption, Precaution, 
Preparedness: Anticipatory Action and Future Geographies'' (2010) 34:6 Progress 
Human Geography 777. 
t4o Balchvin, supra note 139 at 173, citing Rachel Pain, cc Globalized }eat? 'lOv.rards an 
Emotional Geopolitics" (2009) 33:4 Progress in Human Geography 466; Ben 
Anderson, "Becoming and Being Hopeful: Towards a Theory of Affect" (2006) 24:5 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 733; Ben Anderson & Adam Holden, 
''Affective Urbanism and the Event of Hope" (2008) 11:2 Space & Culture 142. 
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to the human and more-than-human world. 141 This more political 
understanding of "futurity" has been particularly well developed in the 
contexts of settler colonial critique and queer theory,142 though, as we will 
see, it resonates with the broader relational insight that problems and 
solutions are best understood through processes of engagement among 
diverse constituencies. 
The orthodox account of intergenerational justice rarely delves into the 
rich literature on "slow violence", harm, and justice over time chat has been 
developed by scholars of environmental justice, Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL), and others concerned with the temporal 
dimensions of persistent global inequality. 143 Nor does the orthodox 
141 See e.g. Katharine Dow's fieldwork on the particular anxieties experienced by 
environmental advocates in Spey Bay, Scotland: Katharine Dow. "What Gets Left 
Behind for }uture Generations? Reproduction and the Environment in Spey 
Bay. Scodand" (2016) 22:3 J Royal Anrhropological lnstimte (NS) 653 at 663, 
asserting that: 
[ i] n ,S pcy Bay, pco pk's primary focus \Vas on cetacean cndangcrn1cnr. bur '\\rhcn we talked n1orc 
about how people have children, it became dear that their fears extended to humans, pointing to 
an endangered future in which the expected link between gcncrativiry and futurity could 
become dcnamrcd. People in Spey Bay connect rcprodunion and children wirh the foture .... 
l'his suggests a sense that infertility may be a sign of environmental problems as well as harbinger 
of endangerment. 
142 Sec e.g. Jose Esteban Mufioz, Cruising Utopia: The Then 1wd There r!f QJ1ecr Futurity 
(New York: Nnv York University Press, 2009); Eve Tuck & Ruben A 
Gaztambide-Fernandez, "Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity'' (2013) 29: I J 
Curriculum Theorizing 72. 
141 A necessarily partial list includes: Nixon, supra note 50; Carmen G Gonzalez, 
"Env.ironmemal Justice and. lnternational Environmental Law" in Shawkat Alam et al, 
eds, Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (London: Routledge, 
2013) 77; Carmen G Gom.alez, "Bridging the North-South Divide: International 
Environmental Law in the Anthropocene" (2015) 32:2 Pace Envd L Rev 407; Sumudu 
Ataparm & Carmen G Gonzalez, "The North-South Divide in International 
Environmental Law: :haming the Issues" in Shawkat Alam et al, eds, International 
Environrnmtal Law and the Glohal South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015) l; Karin Mickelson, "Beyond a Politics of d1e Possible? South-North Relations 
and Climate Just.ice" (2009) 10:2 Melbourne J Intl L 411; Anna Grear, "Towards 
'Climate Justice'? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: 
Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Furnre Law and Policy" (2014) 
5:0 J Human Rights & Envt 103; Joyeera Gupta, "Climate Change: A GAP Analysis 
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account, or mainstream environmentalist discourse on toxics, confront the 
challenges posed by queer theorists to visions of futurity that em brace 
"reproductive and heteronormative politics of hope"-let alone queer 
theoretical revisions of this critique in light of assisted reproduction. 11 ; A 
relational approach to intergenerational justice requires attention to these 
voices and perspectives, and more. 
A full exposition of diverse perspectives on futurity is necessarily a 
massive, ongoing, collective project, and certainly beyond d1e scope of d1is 
paper. What we can offer, however, is an example of one significant angle of 
vision and discourse that has been left out of the orthodox account of 
intergenerational justice, and mainstream conversations about everyday 
toxic exposures: critical disability studies. We have chosen critical disability 
studies as our central example because it presents a rich conversation on 
questions relating to toxics and justice over time that cuts against the grain 
of mainstream accounts of toxic exposure, thus offering a glimpse of what is 
missing from approaches that treat future persons as a homogenous, 
average-able group, whose interests are best discerned with reference to 
claimed objectivity. In particular, having set out the very real concerns 
posed by exposure to toxic chemicals, critical disability studies scholarship 
calls on us to confront evocations of"anomalous bodies" as emblems of a 
tragic or dystopian future as constituting a distinct set of harms with their 
own distinct intertemporal dimensions. Moreover, critical disability studies 
scholarship offers a vision of futurity that is itself hospitable to relational 
analysis. The critical disability studies focus on social construction in 
particular is deeply attentive to the importance of intersubjective 
Based on Third \'{'orld Approaches to International Law" (2010) 53: 1 German YB Intl 
L 341; Julia Dehm, "Carbon Colonialism or Climate Justice? Interrogating the 
International Climate Regime from a T\VAIL Perspective" (2016) 33:3 \X'indsor YB 
Access.Just 129; UshaNatarajan, "T\X'AIL and the Environment: The State of Nature, 
the Nature of the State, and the Arab Spring" (2012) 14: I Oregon Rev Intl L 177; 
Michael M'Gonigle & Louise 'fakeda, 'The Liberal Limits of Environmental Law: A 
Green Legal Critique" (2013) 30:3 l'acc Envtl L Rev 1005. 
t 44 Stu Marvd, "Polymorphous Reproductivity and the Critique of Futurity: 'foward a 
Queer Legal Analytic for Fertility Law" (2013) 4:2 Jindal Global L Rev 294 at 306, 
quoting Judith Halberstam, "The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Studies" (2008) 5:2 
Graduate] Soc Sci 140 at 141. 
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relationships over time, especially as contemporary individuals and 
communities define "harm" in their imaginings of the long-term 
consequences of toxic exposures. 
Critical disability studies scholarship begins with the premise that 
disability is relational. It does not reside in the minds or bodies of 
individuals, but in the natural and built environments that individuals 
inhabit: the social institutions, laws, and policies within which they are 
embedded and that regulate d1eir daily interactions and encounters; and d1e 
"social patterns that exclude or stigmatize particular kinds of bodies, minds 
and ways of being."1• 1 This understanding of disability stands in stark 
contrast to the medical model of disability whereby atypical bodies and 
minds are regarded as deviant, pathological, defective, and in need of cure, 
fixing, rehabilitation, or even elirnination.146 Disability, understood as a 
biological phenomenon, is "the presence of a physical or cognitive 
difference that deviates negatively from a 'mundane' norm." 117 Our framing 
of disability, like that of a number of critical disability scholars, does not 
deny the materiality of the body-the experiences of pain, altered mood, or 
living with one limb118-but suggests that we cannot make sense or 
meaning of these qualities or experiences of embodiment outside of the 
socio-cultural or medical practices and familial, community, and 
t45 Alison Kafer, frminist, Quee1; Crip (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013) at 6. 
14(' H ..csponding to disability according to the n1cdical approach requires individual 
treatments, rehabilitation, and medical research directed at cure, rather than social 
responses and acconunodations and extensive social change, while expertise for 
disability lies with medical practitioners and health care providers, not >virh persons 
with disabilities themselves. 
1
'
7 Tom Koch, "Disability and Difference: Balancing Social and Physical Constructions" 
(200 I) 27:6 J Med Ethics 370 at 370. 
1
•R Carol Thomas and Susan \Vcndcll, for example, have both challenged rigid social 
models of disability that limit explanations of the ability of persons with disabilities to 
participate as foll citizens in society to social/ environmental factors and fail to account 
for bodily differences or limits. See Carol Thomas, Female Forms: Dis,lbility, Hum.m 
Rights, and Society (London: Open University Press, 1999); Susan Wendell, The 
Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (New York: 
Routledge, 1996). 
42 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL 51:1 
governance relationships that give diem meaning.H9 Stacy Alaimo goes even 
further and argues that we also need to attend to how toxic materiality-
including BFRs and phthalates-affects and constitutes disability. 150 Our 
bodies are in constant interchange with our environments from the 
moment of conception. As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson reminds us, 
"the changes that occur when body encounters world are what we 
call disability."111 
For disability scholar Alison Kafer, " [ d ]is ability is experienced in and 
through relationships; it does not occur in isolation."m For example, 
disability exists in the relationship of being considered outside of the norm, 
the relationship of being stigmatized, as well as in all ableist encounters. In 
these relationships, disability is a form of disadvantage or oppression that is 
systematically imposed on cop of one's impairment.15 ' Understanding that 
disability is constructed, including through relationships, enables us to 
appreciate that disability is "caused by a contemporary social organization 
that takes little or no account of people with impairments" 15• and requires 
that we look to sources beyond the individual for causes of disablement. 
Critical disability scholarship instructs us to see the ways in which disability 
is not an ontological reality-a form of individual pathology to be 
remedied or prevented-but rather how mind-body differences are 
normatively ascribed meaning and value within socio-material contexts. 
On this understanding, each of us is potentially disabled (especially in 
an ableist world). Indeed, we are all simultaneously abled and disabled 
149 Dan Goodley, D is/ability Studies: Theorising Disahlisrn and Ahleisrn (London: 
Routledge, 2014) at 64. 
"
0 Stacy Alaimo, Bodiry J\latures: Science, Environment and the 1Waterial Self 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010) at 12 . 
isi H.oscn1aric c;arland-Thon1son. ''l)isability and Representation,, (2005) 120:2 p;vfLA 
522 at 524. 
15
' Kafer, supra note 145 at 8. 
l :;~ Sh<.::lley 'lh:n1ain, "Foucault, Gov<.::rnn1entality1 and Critical Disability Theory: An 
Introduction'' in Shelley Lynn 'Ii-emain, ed, Foucault and the Government ofDisability 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005) I at 9. 
151 Ibid. 
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depending on time, place, and undertaking.As SarahJaqnette Ray explains: 
" [a J bility is relative to phase oflife and to society's structural expectations 
and physical designs. Accessibility and design are relative to the ableism that 
informs their construction."15s Thus, disability is a dynamic or a 
"continuum;'156 "where one is disabled in different spheres of life and to 
different degrees."157 
Still, as Eli Clarel58 and others119 acknowledge, the recalcitrance of the 
body pushes back and invites us to consider the complex relationship 
between disability and illness. While disability rights activist, writer, and 
wheel chair user, Catherine Frazee is fond of pronouncing: 'Tm the 
healthiest person I b10w,'' 1t•11 Susan Wendell has written, "some unhealthy 
disabled people ... experience physical or psychological burdens that no 
amount of social justice can eliminate. Therefore, some very much want to 
have their bodies cured, not as a substituce for curing ableism, but in 
addition to it."161 This impetus flows, however, not from a desire to bring 
1 ss SarahJaqucttc Ray, The Ecologiod Other: Environmental Exclusion in American Culture 
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2013) at 66. 
116 Ibid. 
157 Peter freund, "Bodies, Disability, and Spaces: The Social Mudd and Disabling Spatial 
Organisations" (2001) 16:5 Disability & Society 689 at 692. 
158 Clare writes about experiences of cancer, chronic painful and. fatiguing illnesses and 
breathing difficulties as examples of conditions that those who embrace bodily 
difference would nonetheless choose to cure or treat. See Eli Clare, Brilliant 
Imperfection: Grappling with Cure (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017) at 60-61. 
15~ See e.g. Carol Thon1as, Sociologie.1 ref-'IJisability and Illness: Conte.1ted Idea . .; in J)isabili~y 
Studi1~s and J.'vtedical Sociology (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Roxanne 
Mykiriuk &JeffNisker, "The Social Determinants of'Health' of Embryos: Practices, 
Purposes, and Implications" in Jeff Nisker, Francoise Baylis, faabcl Karpin, Carolyn 
McLeod & Roxanne Mykitiuk, eds, The ''Jiealtl~y" Embryo: Social, Biomedical, Legal 
and Philosophical Perspectives (London: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 116. 
1611 Catherine Frazee, "Genomics in the Public Interest: Unheard Voices" 2004 GE3LS 
Symposium-Genomics in an Open Society, Vancouver BC, 6 Februar y 2004, online: 
<www.genomecanada.ca/ sires/ default/files/ pdf/ en/ G E3LS _ SpringSununer2004.pdf>. 
16 1 Susan \"\'endell, "Unhealthy Disabled.: Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities" (2001) 
16:4Hypatia17 at 18. 
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the body or mind in line with imperatives about the normal or proper 
body, but from a wish to reduce suffering. Acknowledging these affective, 
material, and phenomenological dimensions of the body/ self relationship 
permits us to see, contrary to the liberal conception of die autonomous 
self, that the subject is never fully determined but provisional and relational, 
and in constant dialogue with time, spaces, environments, objects, 
and experiences. 
Efforts to conceptualize the embodied effects of toxic exposures as 
"harms" to present and future persons often rely upon a conception of the 
"natural" or the "normal" in characterizing embodied difference. 162 Critical 
disability scholars draw our attention to the way in which the conditions 
linked to toxic exposures are considered incidents of harm, injury, tragedy, 
and degradation caused by the disruption of the natural body and the 
natural environment by syn the tic chemicals. 16 ' This imperative to eliminate 
disability "defects" expressed in environmental health discourses is 
pervasive. Moreover, from the perspective of intergenerational justice, the 
impetus to eradicate the harm in the present is perpetuated into the future. 
Because, as Kafer explains,"[ t] he presence of disability ... signals ... a future 
that bears too many traces of the ills of the present to be desirable ... a 
future with disability is a future no one wants". 164 How we think about or 
conceptualize disability in the present determines how we envision 
disability in the future. And, the common normative view is that "it is the 
very absence of disability that signals [a] better future" for us and for our 
16 2 Scott, '"Gender Benders": supm note 131 at 255-56. 
16
.J In some ways, Eve Tuck's call for a moratorium on "damage-based research" should reach 
environmental health and justice researchers decrying "birth defects: "developmental 
delays" and orher possible impacts of toxic exposure as well. With particular reference to 
research on Indigenous communities, Tuck notes how damage narratives-even when 
motivated by a desire to document and draw attention to "peoples pain and broke1mess" 
for the purpose of"hold(ing] those in power accountable for their oppression" -have 
the result of"reinforc[ing] and reinscrib[ing] a one-dimensional notion ofthese people 
as depleted, ruined, and hopeless": Eve Tuck, "Suspending Damage: A Letter to 
Communities'' (2009) 79:3 Harv Ed Rev 409 at 409. 
16
' Kafer, supra note 145 at 2. 
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progeny. 16 5 Disability is often viewed in mainstream environmental health 
discourse as the sign of no future or no good future. 
In response to these views, Kafer writes that we need to ensure that 
discourses on the "possible impairments linked to toxic exposures do not 
replicate ableist language and assumptions."166 She asks how we can 
challenge toxic environments and the use of toxics without relying on the 
fear of the "harm" of disability to motivate a public response thereby 
perpetuating socially sanctioned accounts of disability fear and attitudes 
that disability is a tragedy. In line with Kafer, Clare elaborates on rhe way in 
which movements to prevent environmental and toxic degradation mobilize 
fears of certain kinds ofbodies-minds-those impaired with cancer, asthma, 
birth defects (sic) and learning disabilities, for example-to lend support to 
their cause. As Clare asserts: "[t]his strategy works because it taps into 
ableism."167 Relying (even implicitly) on notions of disability and chronic 
illness as undesirable and tragic conditions in need of cure, prevention, or 
elimination, such campaigns perpetuate stereotypical and harmful views 
about the guality of life of chose living with body-mind diHerences. In 
addition, as Clare argues: 
by bluntly leveraging ableism, [such strategies] conflate justice with the 
eradication of disability. The price disabled and chronically ill people pay 
for this argument is high. It reduces our experiences of breathing, ofliving 
wich conditions deemed birth defects, of having cancer, of learning in 
many differem ways co proofs ofinjustiee. This reduction frames disability 
yet again as damage located entirely within individual body-minds while 
disregarding the damage caused by ableism .... It declares us as unnatural as 
coal-burning power plants. 1 "'~ 
161 Jhid at 2. 
166 Ibid at 159. 
167 Clare, supra note 158 at 56. It has also been demonstrated that such strategies tend to 
tap into an underlying hctcronormativity. Sec Scott, '"Gender Benders'", supm note 131 
at 255-56; Mel Chen, "Toxic Animacics, Inanimate Affections" (2011) 17 :2-3 GLQ:J 
Lesbian & Gay Studies 265. 
16 8 Clare, supra note 158 at 56. 
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From the point of view of those living with body-mind differences, 
proponents of the anti-toxics movement, in working to eliminate or 
decrease exposures that may cause disability, are often motivated by fear of 
disability. While scientific and research resources are allocated to 
investigating the environmental toxic exposures that cause physiological and 
morphological mutations that result in disability in current and future 
generations, from a disability justice perspective, it is the toxic social 
environments, more than toxic chemical environments, that are in fact 
harmful to present and future generations of persons with disabilities. We 
must think beyond the narrow view of chemical exposures as a cause of 
disability, and instead confront the role played by pervasive toxic social 
environments that treat disability as a harm requiring prevention or cure. 
These socio-toxic environments are related to discrimination, lack of 
accommodation, and socio-economic disadvantage for persons with 
disabilities and are reinforced in the world of emerging and 
increasingly-promoted prenatal screening practices encouraging the 
prevention of birth of persons with disabilities. On this view, it is this 
socio-toxic environment that is more harmful for persons with disabilities 
than the risks of toxic exposures. 
From this perspective, it is imperative that research on and 
understandings of toxic exposures not conflate environmental injustice and 
harms with body-mind difference, and disaggregate the possible results of 
exposures to toxic substances that affect the body from the person-
however they are embodied. Moreover, it is essential that researchers and 
policy makers do not cast disability as tragedy or harm by regarding persons 
with disabilities as the signs of environmental injustice. Such perspectives 
efface the ways in which we are all affected by toxics, not just those of us 
with visible or diagnosed "abnormalities" or harms. 11'9 
In assessing the potential harms of everyday toxics such as BFRs and 
phthalates, critical disability studies scholars insist that we cannot rely upon 
'
69 This is not to suggest that all persons are equally situated in relation to toxic exposure 
levds and burdens, equally attributed responsibility for avoiding exposure or risk of 
exposure, or rhar rhey have equal power in determining which risks of exposure to 
assume. As we have argued elsewhere in this article, all of these are unevenly distributed 
on the basis of gender, race, socio-economic status, and geography, for example. 
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normative conceptions of the body in assessing che effects of toxics on 
embodied difference. While toxic exposures may affect embodied variation, 
they do not create it; human bodies are already highly variable. Clare uses 
the example of monocultures to advance arguments regarding the dangers 
of imperatives cowards removing difference from our non-human and 
human worlds. Monocultures are "ecosystems that have been stripped, 
through human intervention, of a multitude of interdependent beings and 
replaced by a single species."170 It is only through persistent effort, force, 
extractions, and purging that monoculmres are created and sustained: "a 
world of damage lies beneath the obvious sameness."171 Clare goes further to 
worry that the eradication of difference toward monoculture is a pattern 
that has been, and continues to be, pervasive over time. He writes that 
"[t]he un-choosing of disability fits into this pattern, one force among 
many, threatening to create a human monoculcure."n Practices of genocide, 
incarceration, involuntary sterilization, and colonization have all led to 
socially created and enforced monoculcures. In emphasizing the potential 
harms of toxic chemicals, we are cognizant chat a monoculture emphasis 
leads some people to believe that diversity is a harm. Monocultures are 
often toxic for che environment and for human societies, be chey biological 
or social. This emphasis on monoculture leads Clare to ask: "How do we 
witness, name, and resist the injustices that reshape and damage all kinds of 
body-minds-plant and animal, organic and inorganic, nonhuman and 
human-while not equating disability with injustice?"m 
Building on the insights of queer ecology scholars, critical disability 
studies proposes that our conception of potential harm needs to rest not on 
an appeal to ideas of a normal or normative body, but rather on a "more 
proactive (rather than polluted) politics that argues for the integrity, 
security, and health of bodies, homes, families, and communities without 
1711 Clare, supra norc 158 at 132. 
171 Jhid at 133. 
172 !hid ar 135. 
l7 l I hid at 56. Similarly, Kafer asks: "How can we continue the absolutely necessary task of 
challenging toxic pollution and its effects without perpetuating cultural assumptions 
about the unmitigated tragedy of disability?'' Kafer, supra note 145 at 159. 
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reproducing the eugenics discourse of the "normal/natural"".171 As Dayna 
Nadine Scott observes in her study of toxic exposure on the Aamjiwnaang 
reserve, advocacy strategies might seek to "find harm where there is illness 
and suffering, but not simply where there is diflerence." 175 This approach 
promotes increased capacity for action as a criterion for intergenerational 
justice, not continued "conformity with existing categories of life."176 As 
Michelle Murphy explains, "[e]pigenetic and toxicological ways of 
investigating [toxic] exposures render legible (and erase) the violence of 
industrial chemicals by tracking damage in bodies".177 But as Murphy notes, 
following Eve Tuck, in collecting and drawing attention to "the data of 
damage '', the environmental health community becomes "entangled in the 
surveillance and pathologization" of various people and communities, now 
and in the foture.m Thus, while we do not want to ignore the ways in which 
today's inequities matter to questions of intergenerational justice, we also do 
not want to allow theories of epigenetic inheritance, as an example, to 
reinscribe race or (dis)ability as inherited pathologies. 179 We want to 
preserve space to imagine what Murphy calls "alter-relations": a continuous 
capacity to generate new, alternative relations and futurities. 
Because we cannot know in advance what the differences of the future 
will look like, an ethic and politics of openness is required to respond to the 
n Giovanna Di Chiro, "Polluted Politics? Confronting Toxic Discourses, Sex Panic and 
Eco-Normacivicy" in Cacriona Mortimer-Sandilands & Bruce Erickson, eds, Queer 
Ecologies: Sex, N11ture, Politics, Desire (Bloomingrnn: Indiana University Press, 2010) 
199 ar 210. 
175 Scott, "'(;ender Benders"', supra note 131at262 [cn1phasis in original]. 
17?• H.obyn Lee & H.oxannc Mykitiuk, "Surviving l)iffcrcncc: Endocrinc-l)isrupting 
Chemicals, lncergeneracional Jusrice, and rhe rucure of Human Reproduction" Feminist 
Theory [forthcoming]. 
177 Michelle ;\forphy, "Alterlife in the Ongoing Aftermath: Exposure, Entanglement, 
Survivance", 21 March 2016, 'foxic: A Symposium on Exposure, Enranglemenc and 
Endurance, on line: <wwi.v.toxicsymposium.org/ convcrsarions-1/2016/ 3/ 1/ altcrlifc-in 
-the-ongoing-aftermath-exposure-entanglement-survivance> [emphasis added] 
[Murphy, "Alrerlife"]. 
t7s ibid. See also 'fock, supra nore 163. 
17
" Murphy, "Alterlife", supra note 177. 
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approach of treating generations as aggregable and average-able units 
that bear and benefit from obligations as a group. In the face of uncertainty 
and uncontrollability-and in the face of what we do know about the 
endurance and transformation of social and embodied difference over 
time-we propose that a more relational approach to intergenerational 
justice is needed. 
In addition to our ignorance about the interests and aspirations of 
future persons, we are also faced with enduring uncertainties as to the 
nature of our future world, and thus a certain unknowability vis-a-vis the 
effects that our conduct today might produce in the future. In the context 
of everyday toxics, this uncertainty is particularly acute since scientific 
evidence of the above-described effects of exposure is not yet (and possibly 
never will be) conclusive.184 We do, however, have some clues as to certain 
social dimensions of the eftects that might be associated with exposure to 
everyday toxics. While toxicologists, endocrinologists, and epidemiologists 
continue to discover and debate the mechanisms through which effects 
occur, other researchers, as demonstrated, have been charting patterns of 
human exposure across demographic groups. Their findings suggest that the 
effects of exposures to everyday toxics will be felt unevenly across diverse 
social constituencies, likely along familiar social gradients of race, class, 
gender, disability, and socio-economic status. Thus, given the deeply social 
nature of toxic exposures and effects, we argue that any legal theory capable 
of grounding meaningful policy prescriptions in this area must be attentive 
to the complex matrix of social, ecological, and material relations that 
shapes and constrains autonomy in this regard. 
This matrix, where embodied human subjects are not just embedded in 
a set of personal and structural social relations, but are also immersed 
ecologically in a material world beyond their control, can further condition 
the agencies and capacities of people. Our analysis produces two insights: 
( 1) an acknowledgement that the vast uncertainty in the nature and 
trajectory of that relationship is reason for humility, but not defeatism; and 
(2) an insistence that any valid conception of justice for "future generations" 
1 ~• Sec e.g. Kim ct al, supm note 27 ar 17 (regarding BFH.s); Swan, ;upra note 21ar183 
(regarding phthalates ). 
 
52 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL 51:1 
moreover, address the imperative to reorient our economic and political 
systems, which seem bound in cycles of production and consumption that 
threaten vulnerable persons (present and future) and ecological systems. m 
This would likely involve deep structural revisions to political and 
economic processes that often leave those bearing the most bodily risk with 
the least decisional power over capital, industrial, and chemical f1owsY 8 
With the Standing Committee's recent recommendation co create an 
advocate for future generations, Canada may become one of the 
jurisdictions to respond to the calls of theorists who advocate for procedural 
mechanisms designed to bring the interests of future persons into 
contemporary policy debates.1s9 As Canada and other jurisdictions consider 
how best to instantiate our obligations to future persons, we urge a 
relational approach to intergenerational justice-one that takes social 
scruccures and relations seriously, confronts the challenges posed by material 
actants, and avoids claims to objective or unsituated perspectives in 
describing desirable approaches to futurity. 1;m Instead of adopting a purely 
educative or advocacy focus, public bodies tasked with intergenerational 
justice ought to include a focus on broad public consultation.191 
Individualization of'Risk as R,;sponsibili~y and Citizenship: A ca.,,; Study of Chemical 
Body Burdens (l'hD Thesis, Univcrsiry of Toronto Dcparrmcnr of Sociology, 2012) 
[unpublished]. 
187 Sec Naomi Klein, This Changes El!erything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (Nnv York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2014). 
18R Sec generally Jackie Leach Scully, Disabifiry Bioethics: ]vforal Bodies, lvforal Di{fi.nnce 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Litcldldd, 2008). 
189 See supra note 5. Bm note United Nations, supra note 5 at 28 (describing Canada's 
existing Commissioner of the Envir01unent and Sustainable Development as an example 
of a "[n]ational institution for future generations"). 
i;m Sec e.g. Shlomo Shoham, Future InteiligenCl' (Giircrsloh: Verlag Bertclsmann Stifrung, 
2010) (describing rhe L~racli Commission for Future Generations, operative between 
200 I and 2006, saying that: "The Commission's opinions were lent great power by its 
absence of imerests other dun cl1e good of the coumry's fornre, by the puriry of ics 
acrivitics and by rhc foundation of irs posirions in both pracrical and research 
knowledge" at 123). 
191 See e.g. Maja Gopel, Ombud.1persons for Future Generations as Sustainability 
lmplemmtation Units (Srakeholder .forum, 2011) (describing rhe Hungarian 
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Technocratic expertise cannot be seen as a substitute for ongoing public 
consultation and participation. 192 As the body of critical disabilities 
scholarship illustrates, there are no objective answers to questions about 
what counts as "harm", what should be done about it, or how these 
determinations may impact present and future persons. Instead, the exercise 
of looking forward through time is inevitably shaped by relationships. 
Relational institutional and policy approaches must acknowledge that deep 
uncertainties about the future are moderated by the knowledge that 
contemporary inequalities will be infused, one way or anod1er, into future 
persons and communities-into their physical environments, their social 
worlds, and in their very flesh. 
Commission for Future Gcncrarions, acrive hcrwcen 2007 and 2011, as being 
characterized by "frequent exchanges of information with citizens" at 11 ), online: 
<www.ieg.earthsystemgovernance.org/ ieg/ sites/ d efau!t/ files/ files/publications/ Goepel 
_ ()mbudspcrsons%20for%20Furnre%20C;enerarions. pdf>. 
in C:f'Mcnno R Kamminga, "The Erhics of Climate Politics: Four :i\fodes of Moral 
Discourse" (2008) 17:4 Environmental l'olirics 673: Kirin Bcicksrrand, "Civic Science 
for Sustainability: Refraining the Role of Experts, Policy-:\fakers and Citizens in 
.Environmental Governance" (2004) 3:4 Global Environmental Politics 24. 
